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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
International organisations increasingly send civilians on crisis operations. Whether they 
are police deployed as an integrated unit, rule of law experts mentoring local officials, or 
monitors looking after the implementation of a peace agreement, the purpose of these 
operations is to improve security. The EU, UN and the OSCE are the most prominent 
providers of civilian missions. When these organisations establish such civilian missions, 
they need to resource them. Civilian missions need to be planned and financed. Mission 
staff needs to be recruited and trained. And civilian missions require equipment and 
mission support. This report analyses the question “How, and through which 
mechanisms, do the EU, UN and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions?”  
The report starts with a stocktaking exercise of civilian missions around the world. Any 
discussion about civilian capabilities needs to be preceded by an understanding of the 
purpose and objective of civilian missions. Yet, in fact, we know very little about the scale 
and scope of these missions as they have developed in the last decade. The report 
discusses the historical development of the EU, UN and the OSCE in terms of civilian 
missions. It also provides a classification of the type of civilian missions addressed in this 
report. Subsequently, it analyses trends in civilian missions since 2003. It examines civilian 
deployments across regions. It furthermore studies the mandates of the different civilian 
missions, demonstrating that mandates tend to be focused on specific areas rather than to 
be comprehensive. The first section of the report therefore provides a basis for the in-
depth study of civilian capabilities in the remainder of the report. 
The report continues, in the second section, by outlining the mechanisms for civilian 
mission planning and capability resourcing in the EU, UN and OSCE. It provides first a short 
overview of the planning procedures in each of these three organisations. It focuses on the 
finance, staff, equipment and mission support. The comparative perspective allows the 
report to identify best practices and shortfalls in terms of planning and resourcing. The 
report finds that all three organisations have tried to incrementally improve their civilian 
capabilities to meet the challenge of rapid response to conflict. Contrary to what is 
sometimes implied in the literature, some of these improvements have been significant. 
That having been said, weaknesses nonetheless remain in several areas and all three 
organisations could benefit from the experience of other international organisations. 
In the third section, the report zooms in on the EU. Based on the experience with missions 
so far and using insights from the comparative analysis, this section discusses in depth the 
financing, staff, and equipment and mission support of the EU. It finds significant 
improvements in terms of financing and the procurement of equipment. The EU has also 
strengthened the training for civilian staff. Challenges remain, however, with the 
availability of staff, the training and duty of care for the contracted staff categories, and 
mission support from Brussels. It is important that the EU addresses these challenges, 
particularly to improve rapid response. While ‘political will’ is sometimes mentioned as an 
obstacle for progress, it is worth noting that the UN and OSCE have been more successful 
in these areas. 
The report concludes with an overview of the findings and policy recommendations to 
improve the practice of EU civilian capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. 
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policy Recommendation 1 (Funding) 
The EU needs to reallocate funding from the operational CFSP budget to the 
administrative budget of the EEAS to strengthen the enabling mission support services in 
Brussels. 
Policy Recommendation 2 (Member states)  
Member states need to do more to ensure that well-trained staff can be selected and 
recruited for civilian missions at short notice. This requires more intensive coordination 
between the relevant ministries within each member state. 
Policy Recommendation 3 (Pre-deployment training)  
The EU needs to make pre-deployment training sustainable, so that every mission member 
can benefit from training. This includes increasing the training budget of the ESDC as well 
as making budget once again available for flexible projects. 
Policy Recommendation 4 (Training for contracted staff) 
The EU needs to provide pre-deployment training as well as relevant specialist training to 
contracted staff. All missions should have a specific budget allocated to pay for such 
training. 
Policy Recommendation 5 (Virtual standing capacities) 
The EU needs to work towards virtual standing capacities that can be used to rapidly 
launch missions and provide specialist support. 
Policy Recommendation 6 (Mission Support Platform)  
The new Mission Support Platform needs to be established as quickly as possible. And its 
capacity should be significantly strengthened. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
International organisations increasingly send civilians on crisis operations. Whether they 
are police deployed as an integrated unit, rule of law experts mentoring local officials, or 
monitors looking after the implementation of a peace agreement, the purpose of these 
operations is to improve security. It is now widely understood that many tasks can be 
better carried out by civilian missions than by military operations. While the military can 
contribute to stability and the protection of civilians in conflict regions, they are ill-
equipped to provide security within refugee camps or support host countries in building up 
resilient and professional police forces. Military operations are also rarely transformative 
insofar as they bring conflicts to a close or prevent future conflicts. 
The European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are some of the most prominent providers of civilian conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding missions. The EU currently has eleven civilian missions under 
the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These include a large 
rule of law mission in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the European Commission oversees countless 
capacity-building projects in related policy areas. Many of the sixteen UN peacekeeping 
operations include significant civilian components. A prominent example is the Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN has also eight political and peacebuilding 
missions. Some are small, but they also include the large operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq. The OSCE has eighteen civilian missions, of which the mission in Ukraine is the most 
prominent. 
When the member states of the EU, UN and OSCE act through these international 
organisations to establish civilian operations to achieve certain objectives, they need to 
resource them. Civilian missions need to be planned and financed. Civilian experts need to 
be recruited and trained. The missions need equipment, such as ICT systems, vehicles, 
laptops and access to intelligence, but also a secure headquarters, office space, 
accommodation, logistics, and medical facilities. All these things combined — finance, 
staff and equipment — are the civilian capabilities required for civilian missions to achieve 
pre-defined objectives.   1
This report analyses the question: “How, and through which mechanisms, do the EU, UN 
and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions?” The focus is therefore 
primarily on the procedures in the headquarters in Brussels, New York and Vienna and less 
so on the availability of civilian resources across the member states.  The report is part of 2
the EU-CIVCAP research project, which analyses the civilian capabilities of the EU in 
conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As such, this report places emphasis on the EU, but 
the perspective is nonetheless comparative. By analysing mechanisms and procedures of 
the EU, UN and OSCE, the report seeks to understand the particularities of the EU. The 
comparative perspective helps us to identify lessons from the other two organisations to 
the benefit of the EU. 
A better understanding of the mechanisms required to make civilian capabilities available 
is critical to rapid deployment. The report seeks, in this respect, to partly address the 
 It is important to make a distinction between latent resources (for example, finance, staff or material) and 1
capabilities. Resources are static and civilian capabilities are dynamic. Capabilities are about how resources 
can be made available for actual missions in support of certain policy objectives. EU-CIVCAP, EU Capabilities 
for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: A Capabilities-Based Assessment (2016), internal document.
 The capabilities of selected member states are addressed in EU-CIVCAP, Report on capability-based analysis 2
of technologies, personnel and procedures, DL2.1 (forthcoming).
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challenge of early response in civilian EU crisis management.  This challenge consists of 3
two elements. First, it is about advance planning, early warning of conflict, and how early 
warning feeds into the planning and decision-making process.  Second, it is about the 4
ability of the EU and other international organisations to react quickly and appropriately 
to information and intelligence resulting from these early warning systems. 
The report finds that the EU has made notable efforts in improving its civilian capabilities 
to react to crises and to engage in crisis management. In doing so, it has focused 
(understandably) on the ‘low-hanging fruit’. For the EU to engage more effectively in 
civilian CSDP, however, it needs to target some of the more complicated challenges. The 
EU and its civilian missions frequently run into the ‘political unwillingness’ of some of the 
member states to spend resources. More often, however, it seems that the high degree of 
centralisation, institutionalisation and legalisation in the EU creates a lack of flexibility. 
Indeed, the UN and OSCE also have to deal with a ‘complicated’ membership, but in 
various cases they have delivered more effectively than the EU.  
Key findings of the report include: 
• During the first decade of civilian CSDP, the task of locating sufficient financial 
resources was almost always a problem. These days, however, the CFSP budget is 
sizeable and it is also sufficiently flexible in how it can be allocated across missions. 
In particular, the annual €37 million allocated for ‘emergency measures’ is very 
useful. The problem is that procurement remains stringent and moreover that too 
few mission staff are capable of navigating the web of complicated EU financial 
procedures. It is also very problematic that insufficient mission funding can be spent 
in Brussels on issues such as training and mission support. A significant reallocation 
of the budget from the missions to the EEAS support structures would be 
appropriate. 
• In terms of mission staff, the EU has significantly improved its recruitment 
procedures and has worked on improving pre-deployment training for seconded staff. 
Two fundamental problems, however, remain. First, since the member states are in 
charge of selecting and training their outbound seconded staff, and as competences 
at the national level are widely spread over various ministries (with different 
priorities), it is difficult to fill vacancies with qualified personnel. Second, no one 
takes adequate responsibility for internationally contracted staff. Unlike those 
working for the UN and OSCE, EU contracted staff often receive no pre-deployment 
training, besides which there are other duty of care issues. This is problematic, as 
the mission administration normally consists of contracted staff, who have to deal 
with EU administrative procedures. 
• The EU has made some efforts to improve its mission equipment and mission 
support. To set up new missions, the EU now relies on a warehouse in Germany. It 
 The warning-response gap is extensively discussed in the academic literature, in particular with respect to 3
the capabilities of the international community to launch rapid action to prevent genocide. See: A. George and 
J. Holl, The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy: A Report to the 
Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997); C. 
Meyer, F. Otto, J. Brante and C. De Franco, ‘Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: Persuasion and 
Preventive Policy’, International Studies Review 12:4 (2010), pp. 556–78; H. Hardt, Time to React: The 
Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); H. Wulf 
and T. Debiel, ‘Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response 
Mechanisms’, Global Governance, 16:4 (2010), pp. 525-47.
 EU-CIVCAP, Report on technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis, DL3.1 (forthcoming); 4
EU-CIVCAP, Report on the EU’s capacities for conflict prevention, DL3.2 (forthcoming).
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has also established a range of framework contracts. The individual missions, 
however, each have primary responsibility for procurement. This has resulted in a 
situation whereby different ICT systems are used across different missions. The EU 
has agreed to set up a mission support platform in Brussels, paid for by the missions. 
When operational, however, it will be a small unit, particularly compared to the New 
York-based UN Department of Field Support and the UN Global and Regional Service 
Centres. 
This report starts with a stocktaking exercise of civilian missions around the world. Any 
discussion about civilian capabilities needs to be preceded by an understanding of the 
purpose and objective of civilian missions.  Yet, in fact, we know very little about the 5
scale and scope of these missions as they have developed over the last decade.  The 6
report continues by outlining the mechanisms for civilian mission planning and capability 
resourcing in the EU, UN and OSCE. Following a short overview of the planning process, 
this section of the report focuses on finance, staff, equipment and mission support for 
each of the three international organisations.  The report subsequently zooms in on the EU 7
and discusses the current state-of-the-art of concepts and planning, finance, staff, 
equipment and mission support. It concludes with policy recommendations to improve the 
practice of EU civilian capabilities. The report is based on official documents, open 
sources, in-depth interviews with key policy makers, and secondary literature. 
 EU-CIVCAP, EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (2016).5
 A notable exception are the annual reports (2010-2013) on political missions by the NYU's Center for 6
International Cooperation, which provide comparative data. In addition, there are many publications on each 
of the individual international organisations.
 The US Department of Defense refers to DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, 7
Personnel and Facilities) in terms of capabilities. See EU-CIVCAP, EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and 
Peacebuilding (2016). While this report discusses the planning process and structure, it pays less attention to 
organisational capabilities, such as doctrine, organisation and leadership. Furthermore, the study of financial 
capabilities is critical in international organisations, as one encounters important questions of burden-sharing 
at the multilateral level (ibid.).
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2. CIVILIAN MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD 
This report starts by providing a basic overview of what the EU, UN and OSCE are actually 
doing in terms of civilian missions. For a capabilities-based assessment, it is important to 
first understand the objectives, scale and scope of civilian missions before it is possible to 
analyse the required civilian capabilities and the shortfalls.  This section begins with a 8
discussion of the historical development of each of the three organisations in terms of 
civilian missions. It also provides a classification of the type of civilian missions addressed 
in this report. Subsequently, this section analyses trends in civilian missions since 2003. It 
also examines civilian deployments across regions. Finally, this section analyses the 
mandates of the different civilian missions. It thus provides a basis for the in-depth study 
of civilian capabilities in the remainder of the report. 
2.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN MISSIONS IN THE EU, UN AND OSCE 
The starting point is that civilian missions are a post-Cold War phenomenon. While the UN 
sent police officers to Congo as part of the peacekeeping operation there as early as 1960, 
deployments were limited during the Cold War period.  There were, for example, only 44 9
civilian police officers involved in UN missions in 1990 compared to 13,560 civilian police 
officers in 2016.  The UN gained serious expertise in terms of civilian missions with the 10
establishment of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and, to a lesser extent, 
the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia in 1992.  In 1995, the UN 11
established the first police-only mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The next big 
step came with the establishment of two transitional administration missions in Kosovo 
and East Timor in 1999. The importance of the civilian components in peacekeeping 
operations further developed during the 2000s. Currently, almost all new UN operations 
are multidimensional deployments with a considerable civilian component. 
In addition to the civilian components of UN peacekeeping operations, the UN has also 
established a range of political and peacebuilding missions. While all are fully civilian in 
nature, this is a fairly wide category of missions. Three origins can be identified. First, the 
UN Secretary-General has a formal mandate for the pacific settlement of disputes.  This 12
has resulted in the appointment of numerous special envoys, as well as mediation and 
‘good office’ activities, including missions.  Second, following the An Agenda for Peace 13
report, the UN placed strong emphasis on conflict prevention, which included 
peacebuilding.  This has triggered the deployment of UN peacebuilding missions since the 14
 EU-CIVCAP, EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (2016). 8
 See further A. Hansen, ‘From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations’, Adelphi Paper 343 9
(London: IISS, 2002); A. Bellamy and P. Williams, Understanding Peacekeeping, Second Edition (Cambridge: 
Policy Press, 2010), pp. 377-96.
 UN, Summary of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces by Countries (30 November 1990), online available: 10
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/1990/1990.zip (accessed 17 March 2016); UN, Contributors 
to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (31 January 2016), online available: http://www.un.org/en/
peacekeeping/contributors/2016/jan16_1.pdf  (accessed 17 March 2016).
 UNTAC had 3,600+ civilian police; UNPROFOR 600+. 11
 Article 99 of UN Charter.12
 R. Mani, ‘Peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention’ in T. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) The Oxford 13
Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 309-10.
 UN Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping, A/14
47/277 – S/24111 (17 June 1992).
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1990s.  Finally, in a number of countries there is no need to deploy blue helmets. In Iraq 15
and Afghanistan, for example, the ‘peacekeeping’ forces were provided by other actors. As 
such, the UN only concentrates on civilian tasks resulting in the deployment of political 
missions.  16
Table 1. Actions by EU, UN and OSCE in conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
Actions in bold italics are analysed in this report. See further methodological appendix. Source: 
compilation by authors. 
OSCE missions are clearly a post-Cold War phenomenon. They were initially a reaction to 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-95; 
1998-99; 2001). Following the Helsinki Summit of July 1992, the OSCE launched ‘missions 
of long duration’ to Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina as well as the Spillover Monitor 
Mission to Skopje in September 1992.  In addition to these missions in former Yugoslavia, 17
the OSCE deployed missions to Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Georgia to help with the 
political transition, and minority and human rights. Following the conclusion of the wars in 
Organisation Actions in conflict prevention, crisis management and 
peacebuilding
European Union Civilian CSDP missions
Military CSDP missions
EU Delegations
EU Special Representatives
Peacebuilding and development projects
United Nations Political and peacebuilding missions
Civilian components of peacekeeping missions
Military component of peacekeeping missions
UN Envoys
UN Country teams
UN Agencies
OSCE OSCE Missions
OSCE Election Observation Missions
OSCE Envoys
 R. Paris, ‘Post-conflict peacebuilding’ in T. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) The Oxford Handbook on the United 15
Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 406-10.
 Paris, ‘Post-conflict peacebuilding’ (2007), pp. 410-11.16
 CSCE at the time. CSCE, 15th meeting of Committee of Senior Officials, Prague (14 August 1992), Journal 17
No. 2, Annex 1. Online available: http://www.osce.org/documents/16159?download=true (accessed 21 March 
2016).
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former Yugoslavia, the OSCE became active in peacebuilding. During the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, the OSCE also started field activities in Central Asia, which typically have a 
light footprint. The Kosovo Verification Mission, which was withdrawn in March 1999 due to 
the NATO airstrikes, was the biggest OSCE mission to date with 1,500 staff.  The 18
deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine in 2014 has led to a revival of 
OSCE missions. It consists of almost 600 civilian monitors.  19
The EU is the latest international organisation to deploy civilian missions. Following the 
creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)  at the Cologne European 20
Council in 1999, the EU established its first civilian mission only in January 2003. The EU 
Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina took over the responsibility for police 
training and police reform from the UN. Since 2003, however, the EU has established a 
wide range of civilian CSDP missions. Some of the most significant include police training 
in Afghanistan (2007-present), a monitoring mission in Georgia (2008-present) and a large-
scale rule of law mission in Kosovo (2008-present). Civilian CSDP missions are kept strictly 
separate from military CSDP operations and from other civilian EU actions (with 
command/control and financial consequences). 
The EU, UN and OSCE thus all deploy civilian missions. It is, however, not straightforward 
to compare them. Whereas the EU makes a distinction between civilian and military 
missions, UN peacekeeping missions often have civilian and military components. 
Furthermore, while the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are not part of the civilian 
missions, similar roles in the UN and OSCE are often precisely labelled as missions. For the 
purpose of this report, we have taken a narrow definition of civilian missions. Rather than 
trying to describe all civilian actions in conflict prevention, crisis management and 
peacebuilding, we prefer to go into more depth.  Table 1 provides an overview of the 21
civilian actions we analyse in this report (in bold and italics). Our focus is on civilian crisis 
management. We exclude political ‘good offices’ missions from our report. 
2.2. TRENDS IN CIVILIAN MISSIONS SINCE 2003 
While the UN and OSCE had already become very active with civilian missions during the 
early-1990s, the starting point for our analysis is 2003. In 2003, the EU deployed its first 
CSDP mission (EUPM), which was coincidentally also civilian in nature. Figure 1 plots the 
number of UN, EU and OSCE missions (left y-axis) as well as the total civilian deployments 
by these three organisations (right y-axis). The total civilian deployments are on a 
logarithmic scale to allow for comparisons between the three organisations (as the UN 
deploys significantly more civilians than the EU and OSCE). This makes it, however, more 
difficult to identify trends for the individual organisations. It is worthwhile to discuss 
these data in greater detail. 
Because the CSDP was only launched in 2003, it is not surprising that the EU has seen the 
most significant development in terms of the total number of missions in the 2003-15 
timeframe: from two missions at the end of 2003 to eleven ongoing missions in 2015. 
Interestingly, the number of EU missions increased significantly in 2005 (including Aceh; 
 OSCE, Kosovo Verification Mission (Closed) (n.d.), online available: http://www.osce.org/node/44552 18
(accessed 4 April 2016).
 OSCE, OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - The Facts (9 October 2015), online available: http://19
www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879 (accessed 4 April 2016).
 European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the time.20
 The EU-CIVCAP project addresses the different dimensions in other reports. 21
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Democratic Republic of Congo; FYROM; Iraq; Rafah) and has been relatively stable since. 
As some of these earlier missions came to an end, the EU deployed important new 
missions to Afghanistan (2007-present), Kosovo (2008-present) and Georgia (2008-present). 
And in the period 2012-14, there has again been an increase in the number of missions 
dealing with the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the situation in Ukraine. Overall, however, 
the number of EU missions has remained stable over the last decade.  
 
Figure 1. UN, EU and OSCE missions (left y-axis) and deployments (right y-axis)  
Sources: UN peacekeeping website, SIPRI Yearbooks, OSCE annual reports. See also methodological 
appendix. 
The personnel numbers in the EU missions show a slightly different pattern from the one 
described above, particularly in the first half of the examined period. From the initial 
level of 590 in 2003 deployments rose to 974 in 2005, a sizeable increase but not in line 
with five-fold increase in the number of missions. Moreover, in 2006 this number dropped 
by half, to 493, reflecting the decision to downsize the two biggest missions at the time 
(in Aceh and Bosnia). The personnel numbers grew again to 2,521 in 2008, mostly 
reflecting the launch of the missions in Georgia and particularly in Kosovo. For the next 
two years they stayed relatively stable, reaching the peak of 2,531 in 2010. Since 2010, a 
decreasing trend can be observed, most pronounced with the contraction to 1,595 staff in 
2014, which was an outcome of the downsizing of the Kosovo mission. 
Compared with the EU, the UN is a more established peacekeeping actor, with a 
considerably larger number of missions (more than double that of the EU in 2015) and an 
even bigger difference in number of mission personnel (over 11 times than that of the EU 
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in 2014). About two-thirds of the missions are peacekeeping operations, while one-third 
are political missions.We see a slightly inverted U-curve in terms of the total number of 
UN missions. The number of missions has gone up from 22 missions in 2003 to a record of 
27 missions in 2008, 2011 and 2012. Since then one can again observe a slight decrease to 
24 in 2015. This has been the result of the closure of some small political missions, but 
also the curtailment of the large peacekeeping missions in Sudan (UNMIS, ended in July 
2011) and East-Timor (UNMIT, ended in December 2012). 
The number of personnel deployed in the UN missions has significantly increased in the 
last decade, rising from 8,312 in 2003 to 19,474 in 2015. This mirrors the significant 
increase in peacekeeping deployments by the UN, which reached 107,000+ uniformed 
personnel in 2015,  following the ‘re-invention’ of UN peacekeeping in 1999 and the 22
keynote Brahimi report of 2000.  While in absolute numbers the civilian components of 23
UN peacekeeping operations are normally much smaller than the military components, the 
increased importance of multidimensional missions during the 2000s has put greater 
emphasis on the civilian dimension. Although the political missions are often smaller than 
the civilian components of peacekeeping operations, the political missions in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and to a lesser extent Libya, also contribute to increased civilian UN deployments. 
The OSCE shares some of the same turf with the EU (see also section 2.3 below), but the 
emergence of the EU as a crisis manager since 2003 has hardly undermined its efforts. 
Overall, the number of OSCE missions has remained quite stable in the period under 
analysis, with a slight decrease in 2011-13. More recently, however, the OSCE has deployed 
two new missions in response to the crisis in Ukraine, bringing the total number back to 
eighteen missions. What is also striking about the OSCE is the rather high number of 
missions. To some extent this is an exaggeration, as several of the activities by the OSCE 
mission activities would be carried out in the EU by EU Delegations, which are not part of 
our analysis. And yet, there seems to be a broad demand for the services of the OSCE. 
Conversely, the number of personnel in the OSCE shows a clear decrease throughout most 
of the period under analysis; from 873 in 2003 to 409 in 2013. However, this consistent 
decline came to an abrupt end in 2014, when the OSCE deployed the two missions to 
Ukraine, thereby increasing the personnel levels to 796 in 2014. These increases are likely 
to continue bringing the total civilian staff of the OSCE to perhaps even higher levels than 
those of 2003. On the whole, however, OSCE missions tend to be small and often have only 
a handful or few dozen deployed staff members. 
To conclude on the trends in civilian missions, it is possible to make three observations. 
First, the CSDP, and the establishment of its missions since 2003, has hardly affected the 
UN and the OSCE. The number of UN peacekeeping and political missions has slightly 
increased, while the OSCE has recently revived after a decade of decline. Second, and 
closely related, the combined civilian deployments by the EU, UN and OSCE are at record 
levels and have been high for at least a decade. It goes without saying that this puts 
significant demands on the available capabilities. Third, despite the importance of the EU 
and OSCE in terms of civilian missions, both organisations are still a long way off from the 
UN effort, which is of a different magnitude. It is therefore important to further 
investigate the division of labour (geographically and in terms of mandates) to understand 
what type of capabilities these organisations need.  
 UN, Monthly summary of military and police contribution to United Nations operations (n.d.), online 22
available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Yearly.pdf (accessed 4 April 2016).
 UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (17 August 2000), A/55/305–S/2000/809.23
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2.3. GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN MISSIONS 
In addition to analysing the number of missions and total mission personnel, it is necessary 
to get a better insight where the different missions are deployed. Figure 2 provides an 
overview of the total number of EU, UN and OSCE missions per geographical region in 
2015. It is clear that Africa has the strongest international presence, with nineteen 
missions, closely followed by Europe with eighteen. There are nine missions in Central 
Asia, six in the Middle East and one mission in Haiti. There is to an extent a geographical 
division of labour between the EU, UN and OSCE. The UN, as a universal international 
organisation, is present in all regions. The OSCE is only present in its member states.  The 24
EU has a significant presence in its immediate but increasingly also wider neighbourhood. 
This reflects its ambition to bring stability to neighbouring regions. 
Figure 2. Number of EU, UN and OSCE missions per region in 2015  
The regions include the Americas, Europe including the Caucasus, Africa, Middle-East and Asia 
(from left to right). The size of the pie-charts is not completely proportional to the total number 
of missions in each region. See further methodological appendix. 
The EU deployment patterns are the reflection of different issues. First, the CSDP was 
established during the late 1990s as a reaction to the inadequate response of the EU to 
the wars in former Yugoslavia. Unsurprisingly, the EU has a strong presence in the Western 
Balkans, but also Ukraine and Georgia. Second, EU member states have had diverse 
interests in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of their colonial pasts. Coupled with the 
ambition of some member states for the CSDP to be more than a regional policy, this has 
resulted in missions in Democratic Republic of Congo. Third, as the EU is a member of the 
Middle East Peace Process, it has also made niche capabilities available in the Palestinian 
Territories. Finally, more recently, the EU seems to take a more strategic approach to its 
deployments with police training in Afghanistan, counter-piracy missions off the coast of 
Somalia, and capacity-building missions (to combat terrorism) in the Sahel region.  
The situation is different in the UN, where peacekeeping and political operations largely 
follow some of the world’s major conflicts (as well as the interests of the permanent five 
 Kosovo is not a participating state of the OSCE.24
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members of the Security Council). Africa is, in this respect, the continent with the highest 
number of missions (in Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, two missions in Sudan, 
Western Sahara and regional missions in Central Africa and West Africa). The other regions 
host comparatively fewer missions but, with the highest number of missions in general, 
the UN is still an active player in all of them. Namely, at the time of writing, four missions 
were deployed in the Middle East (in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and a regional truce mission 
covering the whole region), three in Asia (in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and regional 
mission in Central Asia), two in Europe (Cyprus and Kosovo) and, as mentioned above, one 
in Haiti. 
Finally, the OSCE activities are concentrated in its member states in Europe and Central 
Asia. As can been seen on Figure 2, OSCE missions are dominant in both regions. No fewer 
than thirteen missions are located in Europe (in Albania, Baku, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Kosovo, to Minsk Conference, in Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Skopje, Yerevan, and three 
missions inside Ukraine or at Ukrainian-Russian border) and five missions in Central Asia 
(Astana, Ashgabat, Bishkek, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). It is important, however, to once 
more point out that OSCE missions are often small deployments. They also often carry out 
functions that in the EU fall under the responsibility of the EU delegations rather than 
civilian CSDP (see below). 
2.4. THE MANDATES OF CIVILIAN MISSIONS 
It is now clear how many missions and personnel the EU, UN and OSCE deploy. It is also 
clear where they deploy them. The final question is actually what these missions do. 
Without more detail on their functions, it is impossible to make statements on the 
required civilian capabilities. On the basis of the mandates of ongoing missions in 2015, 
ten types of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding tasks can be 
identified. Overall, an average mission deployed by the EU, UN and OSCE carried out 3.15 
tasks. Contrary to popular wisdom on the comprehensive approach and multidimensional 
missions, this shows that the missions’ mandates tend to be focused. 
In comparison to the other two organisations, the EU deployed relatively focused civilian 
missions. An average EU mission in 2015 was mandated 2.18 tasks. The most common task 
was support to police, with just over half of the missions carrying it out (six of eleven 
missions), followed by Security Sector Reform (SSR) and border management (each by four 
of the eleven missions). Four other tasks were each carried out by two different EU 
missions each: anti-terrorism / anti-piracy activities, support to judiciary, mediation, and 
support to armed forces. Only one mission was responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of a peace agreement (Georgia) and none of the missions dealt with 
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). 
The situation was slightly different for the UN, which had the most comprehensive 
missions of the three organisations — on average 3.63 tasks per mission. It was also the 
only organisation which covered all ten identified tasks across its missions. For the UN, the 
most common task by far was the monitoring of peace agreements, conducted by 18 of 24 
missions.  Similar to the EU, support to police was also an important component (fifteen 25
missions). SSR followed with eleven missions; and DDR, and support to both police and 
judiciary were dealt with by ten missions. Other tasks were less common: riot control was 
carried out by six missions, support to armed forces by three missions, and both counter-
terrorism / anti-piracy activities and border management by two missions. 
 This includes, for example, monitoring the human rights situation in a country. Abuses of human rights can 25
undermine the sustainability of peace.
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Finally, the OSCE missions were situated in between the EU and UN as concerns the 
breadth of their activities. On average they carried out 3.11 tasks. Contrary to the UN and 
especially to the EU, support to the judiciary was the most common task, with 14 of 18 
OSCE missions addressing this. Almost equally important was support to police, in line with 
the other two organisations, with twelve missions working in this field. Counter-
terrorism / anti-piracy activities as well as border management were also rather common 
tasks, although slightly less so, with respectively eight and seven missions addressing 
them. Other activities were less common: mediation was carried out by five missions; 
monitoring, support to armed forces and SSR by three; and only one mission dealt with 
DDR. Finally, riot control was not part of the mandate of any OSCE mission, which is 
unsurprising given the lack of executive functions possessed by the organisation. In 
general, OSCE mandates seem to be quite general when the actual (limited) resources of 
the missions are taken into account.  
 
Figure 3. Tasks of EU, UN and OSCE ongoing missions mentioned in their formal mandates (as of 31 
December 2015). 
100% implies that all missions of organisation A carry out task Z. See further methodological 
appendix. 
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3. MECHANISMS FOR MISSION PLANNING AND RESOURCING: EU, UN AND OSCE 
3.1. THE EU AND CSDP MISSIONS 
3.1.1. Overview of the CSDP planning process 
The EU deploys civilian and military operations under the framework of the CSDP, as well 
as a limited number of operations with a hybrid civil-military character.  The distinction 26
between civilian missions and military operations is important, as they have different 
planning procedures and command structures. They are also resourced differently in terms 
of personnel, budget and material capabilities. The mechanisms for civilian missions are 
more centralised and Brussels-based than those of military operations.  27
The planning of civilian and military operations involves a number of documents drafted 
by EU bodies and adopted by the member states in the Council. These documents include 
the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), Military or Civilian Strategic Options (MSOs/CSOs), 
the Council Decision, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and the Operations Plan 
(OPLAN). Not all of these documents are always required and some steps may be skipped 
when rapid response is required.  They can be complemented by informal options papers 28
and are often informed by EU fact-finding missions and information from other 
international actors.  
The initial stage of the planning process (strategic planning) is largely similar for both 
civilian and military operations. It starts with a paper on the Political Framework for Crisis 
Approach (PFCA) drafted by the geographical desk in the EEAS to provide a comprehensive 
approach to crises. This is informed by consultations within the EEAS-led Crisis Platform. 
Following a green light from the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the integrated 
Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in the EEAS takes the lead. It drafts the 
CMC for adoption by the Council, which is the first planning document. The document 
explains “what to do, why, where and with whom” and sets out the overall parameters of 
a mission.  Following the revised 2013 Crisis Management Procedures, the CMC is 29
accompanied by a Council Decision and a Budgetary Impact Statement. This allows a Head 
of Mission/Commander to be appointed, the headquarters to be activated, and gives 
immediate access to the budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).   30
 For a complete overview see the website of the EEAS, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-26
operations/index_en.htm (accessed 29 January 2016). 
 Council of the European Union, Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian 27
Operations in Crisis Management, 9919/07 (23 May 2007); Y. De Kermabon, ‘Crisis Management Procedures’ in 
J. Rehrl (ed.) Handbook for Decision Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union 
(Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of 
Austria, 2014); A. Mattelaer, ‘The CSDP Mission Planning Process of the European Union: Innovations and 
Shortfalls’, in S. Vanhoonacker, H. Dijkstra and H. Maurer (eds) ‘Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the 
European Security and Defence Policy’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Special Issue 1, 14 (2010), 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-009a.htm; H. Dijkstra, Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An 
Institutional Perspective (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
 De Kermabon, ‘Crisis Management Procedures’ (2014), p. 45.28
 EEAS website, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-29
instruments-agencies/cmpd/index_en.htm (accessed 29 January 2016).
 T. Tardy, ‘CSDP in Action: What contribution to International Security’, Chaillot Paper 134 (Paris: EU-ISS, 30
2015), pp. 25-6. The latter is important as the CFSP budget is much larger than the EEAS administrative 
budget. Due to this Council Decision, money becomes available for fact-finding missions as well as the mission 
start-up phase.
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Once the CMC is adopted, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) drafts the MSOs and the Civilian 
Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) drafts the CSOs.  Following the Strategic Options, 31
civilian and military planning processes start to diverge. Civilian planning stays in Brussels, 
while military planning moves to the Operations Headquarters (OHQ) located in one of the 
 CSOs are regularly skipped in civilian CSDP planning. More emphasis is placed on the initial CMC. Decisions 31
get front-loaded before substantial planning can take place.
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Box 1: EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)  
EULEX is the largest EU civilian mission deployed to date. It was launched in February 
2008, days before the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, but it became 
fully operational only in April 2009. At its peak it consisted of almost 1,700 international 
personnel, including from five non-EU contributors (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey 
and the US). It is currently below 700 as the mission is phasing out. EULEX engages in 
‘Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA)’ working with Kosovo institutions, judicial 
authorities and law enforcement agencies. Uniquely for the EU, it also has executive 
functions, concentrated on prosecuting war crimes, organised crime and high level 
corruption as well as other serious crimes. 
Photo credits: ©EULEX 
One of the most challenging tasks has been bringing the rule of law to the North of 
Kosovo, an area inhabited by the Serbian minority not recognising Kosovo institutions. 
The political situation was particularly difficult before the start of Pristina-Belgrade 
dialogue in 2011. EULEX faced, among others, the destruction of crossing points at the 
border with Serbia and violent clashes between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. EULEX was 
accused by part of Kosovo Serbian population for supporting Kosovo’s government, and 
therefore not being neutral. On the other hand, the mission also evoked criticism from 
Albanians for allegedly being too cautious in its activities in the North. The mission still 
maintains a Formed Police Unit to intervene in the area if necessary.
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member states.  The two key documents for operational planning are the CONOPS and 32
OPLAN. To simplify, the CONOPS provides an ideal overview of the mission plan. It also 
includes the commander’s ‘wish list’ in terms of the capabilities needed. The Operations 
Plan, on the other hand, is a more detailed version of the CONOPS, based on the actual 
capability commitments of the member states. The civilian CONOPS and OPLAN are 
drafted by the Civilian Operations Commander in the Civilian Planning and Conduct 
Capability (CPCC), while the military documents are drafted by the Operations 
Commander in the OHQ. 
Once the OPLAN is approved by the Council, the operation can be formally launched 
through a second Council Decision. This also sets the budget for civilian missions. Civilian 
missions are commanded by the Civilian Operations Commander in the CPCC, but in reality 
the appointed Head of Mission on the ground and the local mission headquarters have 
considerable discretion.  Military missions are commanded by the Operations Commander 33
in the OHQ, which has direct authority over the Force Commander in the Force 
Headquarters (FHQ) on the ground. All commanders and heads of mission regularly appear 
in the PSC where the national ambassadors provide them with strategic guidance. 
3.1.2. Resources for civilian CSDP missions 
Force generation for military operations is relatively straightforward. During the force 
generation conferences, member states make military contingents and/or enablers (e.g. 
logistics, transport, medical facilities) available. These military contingents are normally 
self-sustained units, trained as a unit with their own equipment. Member states pay for 
their contributions themselves on the basis of the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle, 
ensure rotations of military staff and make sure that their soldiers arrive on time.  The 34
problem is that member states may neither be willing nor able to make sufficient 
contributions, but the process itself is not overly complicated. 
Civilian force generation is very different. With the exception of the Integrated Police 
Units (IPUs; e.g. riot control police), all deployed civilian personnel must be recruited on 
an individual basis.  This includes not only the staff at the mission headquarters, but also 35
every single monitor, policeman, judge, prosecutor, customs official and penitentiary 
official. Furthermore, civilian CSDP missions are largely paid for through the CFSP budget, 
which is also managed by the Brussels institutions. As such, resourcing the civilian missions 
requires considerable human resources management and financial administration. 
To better understand when and how civilian missions are resourced, it is important to start 
with the budget. Civilian missions are, for the most part, funded through the EU budget.  36
Under budgetary section III ‘Commission’, there is title 19 ‘Foreign policy instruments’, 
 OHQs are available in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. The EU can also use the NATO 32
infrastructure through the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003. If none of these options are available, the EU can 
activate its Operations Centre within the EUMS.
 Council of the European Union, Draft Guidelines (2007).33
 Only a small proportion of the budget, the so-called common costs, is carried by the all the member states 34
through the Athena mechanism. Council Decision, Establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the 
common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena), 2011/871/CFSP 
(19 December 2011).
 Federica Mogherini questions this practice with a view to rapid response, High Representative, Contribution 35
to the June 2015 European Council (2015) p. 8, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/report-
ahead_european-defence-agency.pdf (accessed 8 February 2016).
 Article 42(2) TEU.36
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which includes chapters on the CFSP (€327 million), the Instrument contributing to 
Stability and Peace (€254 million), the Partnership Instrument (€120 million), Election 
Observation Missions (€45 million) and Information Outreach (€12 million).  The largest 37
part of the ‘CFSP budget’ goes into civilian CSDP missions, but it also pays for the EU 
Special Representatives, for support for non-proliferation and disarmament mostly 
provided to other international organisations, and for emergency, preparatory and follow-
up measures.    38
The organisation of the budget is significant, as its design has implications. First, the 
budget is negotiated in the context of the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework, 
which sets some of the parameters. The budget is then negotiated in more detail annually. 
This method of accounting makes it difficult to make money available to respond to 
unforeseen crises, such as the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. The launch of the mission in 
Ukraine was, for example, “possible only because of the transfer of funds from other 
budget headings”.  While the CFSP budget has increased significantly over time, which 39
creates more flexibility in case of emergencies, advance budgetary planning remains 
difficult. Second, the EU budget is negotiated between the member states and the 
European Parliament. It is administered by the European Commission. As such, decisions 
on the CFSP budget involve a considerable number of actors. 
The budget for each individual civilian mission is determined in its Council Decision and 
the accompanying Budgetary Impact Statement. Because the EU budget provides the 
largest part of the financial resources, member states first need to agree on the CONOPS 
and the required civilian capabilities. The CONOPS provides sufficient detail (e.g. the 
number of staff members) to determine the overall budget of the mission. The Council 
Decision concerns the full duration of the mission, which typically covers a couple of 
years, which means that the mission’s overall budget still needs to be brought into line 
with the EU’s annual budgetary cycle. The Council Decisions are negotiated by the 
member states, in close consultation with the EEAS and the Commission.  
In terms of the staffing of the missions, there is an important distinction between 
seconded officials and international and locally contracted staff. While the latter are fully 
paid for by the CFSP budget, the costs of seconded officials are normally split between the 
EU and the contributing member states.  The member states cover the salaries of the 40
outgoing seconded personnel, while the EU covers per diems as well as hardship and risk 
allowances which staff receive on top of their salaries.  Due to this difference between 41
seconded and internationally contracted staff, it is important to get the balance right. 
Preference is given to the seconded officials, who make up the majority of the civilian 
staff.  
The Head of Mission is responsible for staff recruitment and personnel policy. He/she is 
normally supported by a Human Resources officer/unit within the mission. The CPCC’s 
Mission Support Division facilitates the process, but only has limited HRM resources due to 
 European Commission, DRAFT General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2016, VOLUME 3, 37
Appropriations 2016 (24 June 2015), p. III/905.
 European Commission, DRAFT General budget (2015), p. III/918-928.38
 High Representative, Contribution to the June 2015 European Council (2015), p. 9.39
 F. Terpan, ‘Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations: explaining change and inertia in a 40
fragmented and flexible structure’, European Security 24:2 (2014), appendix 1.
 Terpan, ‘Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations’ (2014), appendix 1.41
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stringent budgetary rules on administrative expenditure in Brussels.  The recruitment of 42
personnel starts with the mission informing the CPCC about vacancies. The CPCC 
circulates a Call for Contributions (CfC) among the member states and sets up the 
selection panels. The Head of Mission then endorses the selection result. The EU is 
developing software (Goalkeeper) which includes standard job descriptions, an overview 
of training opportunities and a roster of deployable personnel.  43
While staff members are recruited on an individual basis, the member states have a 
significant responsibility. This not only involves putting forward candidates for 
secondment, but also putting together a pool of deployable personnel, providing pre-
deployment training and ensuring that sufficient career opportunities are available for 
redeployed staff members. Critically important, in this respect, is the role of the 
ministries of interior and justice. While the civilian missions are normally negotiated by 
foreign affairs diplomats, the other ministries have to actually make the staff available.  44
Most interior and justice ministries do not adequately prepare staff for missions outside of 
national territory.  Many member states provide some pre-deployment training. Several 45
pan-EU courses have also been developed, including through the European Security and 
Defence College (ESDC), but improvements can still be made. 
While personnel take up the large majority of the budget and efforts in civilian missions, a 
range of material capabilities is required as well. The EU has a warehouse in Germany 
which provides vehicles and other equipment during the deployment phase. An upgrade to 
the warehouse is being discussed, in light of a new tender, to ensure that it plays a role 
during and after re-deployment. The EU increasingly uses framework contracts, negotiated 
with suppliers for a longer period of time. The rules of procurement have furthermore 
recently been made more flexible to take account of the difficult situation in which 
civilian missions are deployed.  
3.2. UN PEACEKEEPING AND POLITICAL MISSIONS 
3.2.1. Overview of the UN planning process 
The UN deploys peacekeeping operations and political missions. It is difficult to neatly 
demarcate both as there is considerable overlap. Peacekeeping operations almost always 
include troops and/or military observers and often have a (sizeable) civilian component.  46
Political missions, on the other hand, are mostly civilian.  In terms of authorised strength, 47
both peacekeeping and political missions vary considerably. Peacekeeping operations can 
be significant due to the military component, but civilian uniformed personnel ranges 
from a few dozen to several hundreds. Political missions can be very small, but some also 
 The EU has agreed to establish a Mission Support Platform for all civilian missions, which should be 42
operational by the end of 2016 (see further below).
 R. Badoux, ‘Training and Recruitment for Civilian Missions’ in J. Rehrl (ed.) Handbook for Decision Makers: 43
The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union (Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the 
Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).
 A. Jacobs, ‘EU Civilian Crisis Management: A Crisis in the Making?’, CSS Analysis in Security Policy 87 (2011), 44
online available: http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:2952/eth-2952-01.pdf (accessed 2 February 
2016).
 High Representative, Contribution to the June 2015 European Council (2015), p. 13.45
 The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is a peacekeeping operation that notably does not include troops; the UN 46
Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an example that does not include a civilian component.
 The UN Mission Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has a guard unit of deployed troops.47
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Box 2. United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) 
UNMISS was deployed after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. The 
independence of South Sudan was the final step of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan of 2005. After the six-year Interim Period, the 
people of South Sudan voted in a referendum for secession. As the world’s newest state, 
it was clear that South Sudan would require significant support. While the emphasis of 
UNMISS was initially on strengthening the capacity of the local government, it soon 
became clear that UNMISS would have a major responsibility in the protection of 
civilians. In December 2013, widespread inter-communal violence broke leading to a 
sharp deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The situation got worse in 2016. About 
2.3 million people have been displaced with 200,000 seeking refuge near the UN 
peacekeeping camps (S/2016/138: para 22).  
Photo credits: ©UNMISS 
As a result of this conflict, the UN increased the military strength of UNMISS from the 
original 7,000 peacekeepers to nearly 12,000 in 2016. As of early 2016, more than 2,500 
civilians are working for UNMISS. In total, it has an authorised police strength of 2,000 
officers, but it still has a significant number of vacancies. India, Rwanda, Nepal, Ethiopia 
and China are the biggest overall contributors. Ghana, Nepal and Rwanda have FPUs in 
South Sudan, while there were more than 30 police contributing countries early 2016. 
That such a significant crisis would break out was not foreseen when UNMISS deployed. 
As a result, it now focuses mostly on the protection of civilians. This involves many 
different activities. Under the traditional ‘good offices’ role, UNMISS organises meetings 
with local authorities and civil society to promote dialogue, peace and reconciliation. 
UNMISS also provides physical protection at six sites for refugees. This includes patrols, 
investigating security incidents including human rights violations, community policing 
and search operations. As a result of these challenges related to the protection of 
civilians, UNMISS is hardly capable of strengthening the government institutions of South 
Sudan in the area of rule of law. 
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include hundreds of international staff, as is the case in Afghanistan. In terms of the legal 
mandate there is no clarity either. Political missions are launched under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter, while peacekeeping operations have both Chapter VI and VII mandates.  48
The UN planning process is described in the policy document Integrated Assessment and 
Planning and revolves around a number of planning documents.  The difference with the 49
EU is that while all major EU planning documents are adopted by the member states, 
within the UN, planning documents are solely owned by the actors who drafted them. The 
documents include the Strategic Assessment, the report of the Technical Assessment 
Mission and the report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC. The UNSC adopts a 
resolution, which formally establishes an operation. The Secretary-General appoints the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who runs the mission on the 
ground. Together with the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner, the SRSG takes 
the lead on operational planning, which includes the Mission Concept and component-level 
plans. 
The UN planning process starts with a Strategic Assessment. This is not unlike the EU’s 
PFCA in that it sets up the broader UN engagement in a conflict. It is written by 
Secretariat-based Integrated Task Force (ITF), which consists of representatives from 
across the UN system.  The ITF is chaired by the lead department, either the Department 50
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The 
Strategic Assessment is an internal document prepared for the Secretary-General and the 
Policy Committee consisting of senior UN officials. It may propose to initiate planning, a 
decision made by the Secretary-General.  51
If planning is initiated, the UN normally sends a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to the 
ground. The composition of the TAM is flexible but normally consists of officials from the 
ITF. If the UN already has a presence on the ground, such as a Country Team, local officials 
will join. This fact-finding mission of one or two weeks results in a report for the hierarchy 
in DPKO/DPA and ultimately for the Secretary-General and the Policy Committee.  On the 52
basis of the report of the TAM, the lead department drafts the report of the Secretary-
General to the UNSC, which is publicly available. This is the end product of the strategic 
planning process within the UN Secretariat and from this point onwards, the UNSC takes 
over. 
The UNSC drafts and adopts a resolution, which is the formal legal basis authorising a 
mission. It includes the legal basis (Chapter VII or not), describes the mandate, the total 
authorised strength and the reporting and review clauses. In practice, the UNSC resolution 
is drafted by the so-called ‘penholder’, often France, the United Kingdom or the United 
States, depending on the relationship of the prospective penholder with the host country. 
The designated penholder and several other UNSC members often do their parallel 
 Chapter VI is about the ‘pacific settlement of disputes’, while Chapter VII is also about ‘peace 48
enforcement’.
 UN, Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (13 April 2013), online available: https://undg.org/main/49
undg_document/un-policy-on-integrated-assessment-and-planning-iap/ (accessed 9 February 2016).
 IAF Working Group, Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook (December 2013), pp. 19, 51-2.50
 United Nations, Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (2013), paragraph 37.51
 H. Dijkstra, International Organizations and Military Affairs (London: Routledge, 2016).52
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planning, including a visit to the ground.  They are thus not bound by the report of the 53
Secretary-General and the planning carried out by the ITF.  
Based on the planning process and the UNSC resolution, the ITF drafts a Directive for the 
SRSG, which signifies the transfer of planning responsibility to the mission on the ground.  54
The SRSG and his/her staff will first focus on the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) for 
the host country. The ISF compares somewhat to the EU comprehensive approach and the 
regional strategies in that it is much broader than crisis management and peacekeeping. 
Within the context of the ISF, the SRSG will draft a Mission Concept. The various 
components of the peacekeeping or political operation (e.g. military, police, political) 
adopt their component-level CONOPS. While command and control rests with the SRSG, 
the mission receives guidance and is supported by DPKO, DPA and the Department of Field 
Support (DFS). Missions also have a regular reporting requirement via the Secretary-
General to the UNSC. 
3.2.2. Resources for the political and civilian components of UN missions 
As with the EU, in the case of UN missions it is useful to distinguish between finance, 
staff, and equipment and mission support. The Global Field Support Strategy (2010-15) of 
the DFS, whose aims were to improve rapid response, efficiency and accountability, and 
the deployment conditions of staff, for instance, similarly addressed these issues.  For 55
the resourcing of UN peacekeeping, we need to distinguish between the military and 
civilian components. There are also key distinctions between peacekeeping and political 
missions. Both are supported through DFS, but they are organised differently in terms of 
the budget. Peacekeeping operations have their own (extraordinary) budget; political 
missions are paid through the regular UN budget. As was the case with the EU, this section 
will first discuss the financing of civilian missions. It then evaluates the recruitment and 
training of civilian staff. This section concludes with a discussion of equipment and mission 
support. 
It is useful to start with the financing of political missions as they fall under the biennial 
general UN budget. This is paid for by the member states on the basis of their GNI and 
population size. Poor countries get discounts, UNSC members pay more, and the US 
benefits from a 22% ceiling. The total UN budget is about $3 billion per year.  This pays 56
for all regular UN staff, the headquarters and operational expenditure. A fifth of the 
regular UN budget goes to the political missions (almost $600 million a year),  which 57
accounts for 90% of the budget of political affairs.  That so much money of the regular 58
budget goes to political missions is a source of tension between the UNSC, which 
 H. Dijkstra, ‘Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN 53
peacekeeping’, The Review of International Organizations 10:1 (2015), pp. 23-41.
 IAF Working Group, Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook (2013), paragraphs 40-1.54
 UN Secretary-General, Global field support strategy, A/64/633 (26 January 2010); UN DFS, Global Field 55
Support Strategy 2010-2015: Overview of Context, Objectives, Results and Lessons Learned (June 2015), 
online available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/overview.pdf (accessed 4 April 2016).
 UN Secretariat, Assessment of Member States’ contributions to the United Nations regular budget for the 56
year 2015, ST/ADM/SER.B/910 (29 December 2014).
 UN Department of Management, Regular Budget 2012-2013 (2012), online available: https://www.un.org/57
en/hq/dm/pdfs/oppba/Regular%20Budget.pdf (accessed 16 February 2016).
 UN General Assembly, Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017, A/70/6 (Sect. 3) (27 April 58
2015), table 3.5.
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authorises the missions, and the General Assembly, which authorises the budget.  The 59
inclusion of political missions in the biennial budget also creates problems in terms of 
flexibility, similar to those of the CFSP budget. As the Secretary-General notes, the 
“current funding arrangements also do not have the flexibility to respond to the funding 
requirements that arise during mission start-up, expansion or transition”.  60
Each peacekeeping operation has its own budget, which is approved by the General 
Assembly on an annual basis.  GNI and population again play a key role, but the payment 61
scale for peacekeeping differs from the UN regular budget. The US, for instance, pays 28% 
of the peacekeeping budget instead of 22%. It is slightly awkward that UN peacekeeping is 
considered an extraordinary activity of the UN,  particularly since the peacekeeping 62
budget, at $8.3 billion, is almost three-times larger than the regular UN budget.  In 63
addition to the budget of each mission, there is the $330 million annual support account 
for peacekeeping. This pays largely for the administrative costs at the New York 
headquarters.  Furthermore, there is a separate budget for the UN Logistical Base (UNLB) 64
of nearly $70 million. 
In terms of expenditure, there is a key difference between deployed uniformed personnel 
(soldiers and police) by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and contracted civilian 
personnel by the missions themselves.  The UN compensates TCCs with a flat-rate 65
reimbursement of $1,332 for each deployed person per month. The UN furthermore 
provides deployed uniformed personnel with a minimal allowance depending on the 
mission. Civilian contracted personnel are fully paid for by the missions themselves. This 
includes international/UN staff in policy functions, national staff providing administrative 
support, enabling functions and local expertise as well as UN volunteers. While uniformed 
personnel substantially outnumber contracted staff, civilian personnel costs in most 
missions are at least 50% of uniformed personnel costs.  In addition to staff costs, each 66
mission has a budget for operational requirements, such as infrastructure, transportation 
and supplies.  
 A representative from Brazil, for example, calls political missions one of the “most important distortions” in 59
the regular budget, United Nations, Amid Growing Global Instability, Special Political Missions Crucial for 
Conflict Prevention, Require Separate Fund, Speakers Tell Fourth Committee (6 November 2015), online 
available: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gaspd598.doc.htm (accessed 16 February 2016).
 UN General Assembly, Review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions, A/60
66/340 (12 October 2011), paragraph 4.
 See also N. Sheehan, The Economics of UN Peacekeeping (London: Routledge, 2011); K. Coleman, ‘The 61
Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation’, Providing for Peacekeeping 7 
(New York: International Peace Institute, 2014), online available: http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/
publications/ipi_political_economy.pdf (accessed 23 February 2016).
 The High-Level Independent Panel notes that peacekeeping is the most important UN activity and such thus 62
not be treated as exceptional, UN, Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting 
our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people, A/70/95 – S/2015/446 (16 June 2015), p. 15.
 UN General Assembly, Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2015 to 63
30 June 2016, A/C.5/69/24 (26 June 2015).
 While the Brahimi Report took issue with the temporary nature of the support account, it now seems more 64
problematic that political missions have no support account. UN, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations (2000), p. xiii. This means that shortages at headquarters are with the political rather than the 
peacekeeping missions. See also UN, Report of the High-level Independent Panel (2015), p. 33.
 For further details see Coleman, ‘The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping’ (2014), pp. 8-12.65
 UN General Assembly, Approved resources (2015).66
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While there are two categories of staff in terms of financing (uniformed versus contracted 
staff), in the terms of recruitment, we need to distinguish between Formed Police Units 
(FPUs), individual uniformed officers/experts, contracted staff, and the standing 
capacities. The FPUs merit attention. These are self-sustained units of about 140 deployed 
personnel, of which at least 120 are police officers.  While they were first deployed 67
around the turn of the century, there has been a rapid increase in their use. By 2011, more 
police officers were deployed through FPUs than on an individual basis.  In 2016, there 68
are 71 authorised FPUs in UN peacekeeping missions with 8,723 police officers as opposed 
to 3,362 individual police officers.  Their key functions are public order management, the 69
protection of UN personnel and facilities, and high-visibility patrols and higher risk 
missions.  FPUs have their own command element as well as equipment and mission 70
support. Because they are self-sustained units, the force generation process is easier with 
FPUs than it is with individual police. Police contributing countries receive a compensation 
for the equipment costs of FPUs in addition to the flat-rate compensation for staff. 
The selection of individual police officers and contracted staff works in a similar way in 
the UN as it does in the EU. Once the initial police concept of operations is available, the 
Selection and Recruitment Section within DPKO can draw up the job profiles, which are 
circulated to the permanent missions in New York.  After an initial check through the 71
applications, tests are organised and selections are made. While the UN has long struggled 
with a high vacancy rate, which the EU and OSCE also experience, it has made a strong 
effort to reduce it as part of its Global Field Support Strategy (from 20% to 15%).  This is a 72
major achievement given the overall increase in deployments. It does not imply, however, 
that the problem is solved. Several missions still have considerable vacancy rates. 
Furthermore, it is also a question of the quality of personnel or the required niche 
capacities. An obvious example is the number of individual female police officers: while it 
has nearly doubled in the period 2009-13 (from 8% to 15%), the number of female police 
officers remains relatively low.  73
A final development has been the creation of standing capacities. Particularly because UN 
missions struggled to get qualified officers and experts in theatre rapidly, it established a 
Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in 2006. With a maximum operational capacity of 40 
officers, this police capability is modest, but it proved particularly helpful during the 
start-up phase of new missions. It can also provide assistance to the existing peacekeeping 
missions.  It is based at the UN Global Service Centre (UNGSC) in Brindisi, Italy. In 2010, 74
 UN DPKO/DFS, Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1 March 2010), 67
online available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/
formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf (accessed 11 April 2016), paragraphs 20-1.
 W. Durch and M. Ker, ‘Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment’, 68
Providing for Peacekeeping 6 (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013), table 1 and figure 2.
 UN, Formed Police Units (n.d.), online available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/69
units.shtml (accessed 11 April 2016). UN, UN Missions Summary of Military and Police (2016), online available: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/feb16_6.pdf (accessed 11 April 2016).
 UN DPKO/DFS, Policy on Formed Police Units (2010), paragraphs 12-5.70
 Durch and Ker, ‘Police in UN Peacekeeping’ (2013), pp. 13-4.71
 Durch and Ker, ‘Police in UN Peacekeeping’ (2013), pp. 15-6, table 2, figure 3a, 3b; UN Secretary-General, 72
Fifth annual progress report on the implementation of the global field support strategy, A/69/651 (9 
December 2014), paragraph 12(e). UN DFS, Global Field Support Strategy 2010-15, p. 3.
 Durch and Ker, ‘Police in UN Peacekeeping’ (2013), table 3a.73
 Durch and Ker, ‘Police in UN Peacekeeping’ (2013), table 3a.74
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the SPC was complemented by a modest Justice and Correction Standing Capacity (JCSC) 
of five persons.  While these standing capacities are relatively small in the context of 75
total UN deployments, it is a niche capacity that helps the UN to more rapidly launch 
missions and provide expertise when necessary. 
In terms of training, there are important distinctions as well between personnel from the 
member states and internationally recruited staff. Pre-deployment training is organised by 
the member states themselves: it is a general course on UN peacekeeping missions and has 
to be based on UN training standards. There is a very substantial number of training 
manuals available as well as a recognised network of training institutes. For 
internationally recruited civilian personnel, the UN Integrated Training Service (ITS) 
provides pre-deployment training at the Global Service Centre. Finally, the missions 
themselves organise mission induction training. This is mission and host country-specific 
training. It is coordinated by Integrated Mission Training Centres (IMTCs) within the 
peacekeeping missions themselves. 
In terms of equipment and support, the UN has set up an elaborate mission support 
structure. Aside from the administrative offices of DFS in New York, the UNGSC in Brindisi, 
Italy, plays a central role. It is the logistical base for all UN entities, including the Funds, 
Programmes and Agencies. It has a warehouse and direct access to Brindisi airport. The 
UNGSC also provides expert teams for the start-up phase of missions. In addition to the 
UNGSC, the UN has the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda. Since many UN 
missions are deployed in insecure regions, the idea is to pool all non-essential 
administrative tasks in a more secure location. The centre in Entebbe, for example, does 
payroll, ICT and training for the peacekeeping operations in East and Central Africa.  
3.3. OSCE MISSIONS 
3.3.1. Overview of the OSCE planning process  76
At the helm of OSCE mission planning are the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and the Conflict 
Prevention Centre (CPC), which is part of the OSCE secretariat. These structures act in 
concert to cover the planning and monitoring of mission implementation in coordination 
with the rest of the secretariat, OSCE field operations, and the special representatives.  77
In terms of actual planning, the most important department in the CPC is the Operations 
Services and its Planning and Analysis Unit. Overall, the CPC is charged with the 
coordination role and works on the mandate for the mission. To do this, it gathers input 
from every single unit and department in the Secretariat.  
The CPC developed the so-called Operational Framework for Crisis Response (OFCR) in 
2013.  This framework is intended as an internal document on the procedures for use by 78
the OSCE’s executive structures to facilitate collective action when addressing a crisis. It 
draws on good practices and lessons identified from the OSCE’s past crisis response 
 UN DPKO, Justice & Corrections: Sustainable Peace through Justice and Security (2014), online available: 75
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/cljas/DPKO-Justice-Corrections-Update-2014.pdf (accessed 
11 April 2016), pp. 48-50.
 This section on the OSCE builds on phone interview #10, May 2016. 76
 OSCE, OSCE Employment: International Seconded Mission Members (2016), online available: http://77
www.osce.org/node/70273 (accessed May 2016).
 OSCE Ministerial Council, Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s Capabilities in 78
Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, 
MC.DEC/3/11 (7 December 2011).
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Box 3. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) 
SMM was deployed in March 2014 at the request of Ukrainian government. Its current 
mandate runs until 31 March 2017. The request itself was triggered by the Russian 
annexation of Crimea in February, but the mission has focused to a large extent on the 
conflict erupting in the east of the country soon after its deployment. SMM is the biggest 
mission which the OSCE has deployed since 2003. It consists of 669 civilian unarmed 
monitors at the end of 2015. As a matter of comparison, its second biggest mission, in 
Kosovo, at its peak numbered only 226 international personnel. The monitors come from 
47 OSCE participating states; however, the majority of them are EU nationals. Moreover, 
the EU and its member states contribute around two-third of the budget of the mission. 
Photo credits: ©OSCE 
The mission’s mandate consists of two types of tasks. Firstly, it deals with gathering 
information and reporting on the ceasefire, the general security situation, specific 
incidents and the impact of the conflict on the local population. Secondly, the OSCE 
monitors engage in reducing tensions and facilitating dialogue between the conflicting 
parties. 
The mission’s headquarters are in Kiev, but the mission’s mandate covers the entire 
territory of Ukraine. However, what this precisely entails is disputed. In the OSCE 
Permanent Council, for example, the interpretative statement of Russian delegation 
annexed to the formal decision 1117, which launched SMM, states that “the Republic of 
Crimea and Sevastopol have become an integral part of the Russian Federation”. 
Therefore, the monitoring teams have not been granted access to this part of Ukraine. 
They have only been deployed to Ukraine’s other big cities (Chernivtsi, Dnepropetrovsk, 
Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kiev, Luhansk, Lviv, and Odessa). Finally, SMM 
is not the only OSCE mission in Ukraine. The mission’s activities in eastern Ukraine are 
complemented by the Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk.  
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missions, such as the Special Monitoring Mission after the 2008 war in Georgia and the 
Community Security Initiative in Southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. While not establishing fixed 
guidelines on exactly what should or should not be done, it provides decision-makers and 
those tasked with implementing decisions with details of existing procedures and an 
overview of what has worked in the past. The OFCR provides the framework for timely 
development of an implementation plan and a budget for a mission. Throughout 2016 it is 
undergoing an update based on the lessons from the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine. 
The main decision-making body in the OSCE is the Permanent Council composed of 
representatives at the level of ambassadors from the 57 participating member states 
(pMS). The Permanent Council meets in Vienna every week. When an operation is 
considered, the ‘host country’ on whose territory the operation will take place has to 
submit a formal request to the OSCE. Representatives of the host country make the case 
for the mission during a Permanent Council plenary meeting. This request will then be 
discussed among the pMS and the respective structures in the Secretariat. It can be an 
intensive process. As the experience of the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine in 2014 
demonstrated, the decision to deploy can sometimes take weeks of intense political 
negotiations.  
The CiO is an important actor in pushing the mission ahead. It changes every year. The 
chairmanship has the power to determine if a mission should become a priority and be 
established. Once the request has been submitted and the chairmanship supports the 
mission, the Planning and Analysis Unit within CPC’s Operation Services starts working on 
the mandate. In doing so, it liaises with the host country, the chairmanship, and relevant 
departments of the Secretariat, depending on what the aim of the mandate will be. Once 
the mandate is set, it is tabled in the Permanent Council where all the pMS vote on it by 
unanimity. The political decision by the Permanent Council is followed by the publication 
of the vacancy notices and the mission’s Operation Plan. Thereafter, budgeting and 
staffing start. The CPC’s Planning and Analysis Unit again takes the lead, working in close 
coordination with the Budget Department and the Human Resources Management 
Department as well as with the host country. 
Often a team from the OSCE goes out on the ground before the launch of the mission to 
conduct local planning. There are no particular documents that prescribe steps for local 
planning; rather it very much depends on the circumstances. Usually the team is formed in 
the Secretariat, recruiting personnel from various departments: the CPC, Budget, ICT and 
Legal Services, etc. Once formed, the team discusses the legal agreement between the 
OSCE and the host countries, the technical agreement on the provision of venues and 
equipment, and the needs of purchasing additional equipment. The local planning usually 
happens only after all the decisions and all the initial planning documents, including the 
mandate of the mission, have been approved.  
3.3.2. Resources for OSCE missions 
The OSCE overall budget is negotiated on an annual basis by all member states. It covers 
the expenses for the whole organisation, including the Secretariat, the Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw and all the field missions. 
This is the Unified Budget (UB). The negotiations are the responsibility of the CiO. All of 
the 57 pMS have to vote on and approve it. The chairmanship is assisted by the Advisory 
Committee on Management and Finance (ACNF) which comprises representatives of all the 
pMS. It gathers throughout the year to discuss the planning for the following year and, in 
particular, what should be changed, and where the budget should be increased or 
decreased. Also, each mission and each unit in the Secretariat has to submit to the ACNF 
its respective budget outline for the following year. 
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In 2016, the Unified Budget is €141.1 million, including secretariat expenditure and field 
operations.  The Secretariat has a total budget of €36.4 million, of which €4.3 million 79
goes to the CPC. The Human Resources Department has a budget allocation of €5.3 million 
and the Department for Management and Finance (€8.5 million) has a devoted Mission 
Support Service (€1.4 million). Interestingly, there are additional funds allocated for field 
operations under the budget line of “augmentations”. These are separate funds in support 
of field missions, the biggest share of which goes back to the Secretariat (€4.5m out of 
€4.7 million overall) for services under its oversight such as: Policy Support Service, 
Operations Service, ICT, HR, management, finance, communication and media, etc.  80
Field operations have a total budget allocation of €83.8 million. Each field operation is 
separately budgeted with budget lines for the Head of Mission’s costs, administrative 
costs, common costs as well as the costs for the different tasks of the missions. Mission 
budgets range from €17.9 million (for Kosovo) to €1.6 million (for the Centre in Ashgabat) 
with the most missions within the €2-7 million range. The Special Monitoring Mission in 
Ukraine (SMM) is not included in the Unified Budget for 2016, which is significant as the 
mission amounts to almost €100 million and has a considerable number of personnel on the 
ground (see Box 3). The SMM in Ukraine is not part of the Unified Budget because of its 
sheer scale and because it was created as an urgent response to the escalating crisis. 
Planning of the SMM took place in January 2014 when the work on the Unified OSCE budget 
was already completed. 
Exceptionally, every single post is justified and mentioned in the Unified Budget (annex II). 
In total the Secretariat has 320.8 full time equivalent (FTE), of which 51 FTE is in the CPC. 
Augmentations account for an additional 58.5 FTE for the field operations. Secretariat 
staff and augmentations are for the most part internationally contracted staff and general 
service staff. Internationally contracted staff members are limited to a 7-years term of 
employment (the higher ranks for only 4-5 years), and there is a general time limitation of 
maximum 10-year terms of employment for the OSCE. This means that while staff can 
move across posts, they can only be with the OSCE for a decade. General service staff 
members are hired under temporary contracts, which can be renewed continuously. 
Most of the OSCE staff members (2,300+ FTE) are serving in field missions. With the 
exception of some of the leadership functions and the local appointments in the general 
service, almost all positions in missions are occupied by staff on secondment or national 
professional officers (local staff in policy functions). When a person is seconded by a pMS, 
the OSCE does not pay any salary from its own Unified Budget.  The only allowance is 81
Board and Lodging Allowance (BLA) as well as travel to/from the mission from Vienna. 
A crucial feature of the OSCE when it comes to financing is its flexibility in finding ways to 
respond to unforeseen circumstances or to act quickly at the early stages of a mission. 
This is accomplished by either achieving savings within existing operations, or by utilising 
previously established contingency funds. The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, for 
instance, needed to be quickly deployed. In the absence of both an approved mission 
budget and an agreed crisis response facility, the OSCE had the option to use a 
contingency fund previously set aside for financing responses to unforeseen circumstances, 
augmented by cash savings from previous years. These two sources helped finance the 
 OSCE, Approval of the 2016 Unified Budget, Decision No. 1197, PC Journal No. 1084, Agenda item 1 (31 79
December 2015), online available: http://www.osce.org/pc/215416 (accessed in May 2016).
 OSCE, Approval of the 2016 Unified Budget (2015).80
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initial set up and daily running of the mission for the first month.  Another important 82
feature is that missions can also be funded by the so-called ‘extra-budgetary projects’. It 
is up to the programme managers within the missions to devise a project. And they have to 
do their own fundraising in Vienna.  
Identifying and deploying personnel presents a second challenge. The OSCE has developed 
an internal roster for rapid deployment. This roster gives the OSCE immediate access to 
information on available staff and their core competencies. The OSCE has tried to develop 
the Rapid Deployment Roster for some time already.  The roster would not have been 83
used if it were not for the SMM mission in Ukraine. The concept is based on two steps. 
First, experienced staff from the OSCE secretariat and other OSCE field missions are 
designated as ‘first responders’ to form the core of a new OSCE mission. Second, this 
initial nucleus is replaced under the standard OSCE procedures. In 2013 the OSCE finalised 
the details of this roster — including potential personnel; key qualifications; generic job 
descriptions and instructions pertaining to the administrative operation of the roster.  84
The Rapid Deployment Roster was never used prior to the SSM in Ukraine, and it is thanks 
to this mission that we have an impression of how the system worked in practice. Although 
it was still under development at the time, the roster was opened to all OSCE staff 
members who were willing to be temporarily deployed to Ukraine. Four days after the 
decision to establish the mission, 31 first responders from the OSCE Secretariat and nine 
from existing OSCE field operations were identified and deployed in Kiev. These personnel 
formed the nucleus of the initial monitoring and key command and administrative staff in 
the mission’s headquarters. Five days later, the first monitors recruited via the regular 
secondment system arrived as well. Within a month (by the end of April, 2014) all first 
responder monitors were replaced by regular seconded staff members.   85
When it comes to training of mission personnel, the OSCE has developed its own in-house 
training programme which covers the basic requirements towards new OSCE mission 
members. It is called ‘General Orientation Programme’ and takes place in Vienna. The 
programme lasts for 5 days and is organised about 8 times per year. It consists of a core 
training module and function-specific briefings. The former covers most of the training 
ranging from an introduction to the OSCE to Transnational Threats and the Conflict Cycle, 
Gender, Ethics, Management, and Media and Decision Making. The latter are geared 
toward specific training related to a concrete position.  In addition, the CPC has 86
developed its own training programme that offers tailored coaching for high level 
mediators, intensive mediation training for support staff in conflict areas, as well as basic 
training for PSCE support staff working on mediation programmes on the ground. Moreover, 
 C. Neukirch, ‘Fast tracking monitors to Ukraine: Twenty four hours from decision to deployment, Security 82
Community’, OSCE Magazine 2 (2014), online available: http://www.osce.org/magazine/122525?
download=true (accessed in May 2016).
 That is the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) and the ‘just-in-time 83
approaches’ (which remained just as ideas, and were never developed as operative approaches)
 C. Neukirch, ‘Early Warning and Early Action – Current Developments in OSCE Conflict Prevention Activities’, 84
OSCE Yearbook 2013 (2014), online available: http://ifsh.de/en/core/publications/osce-yearbook/
yearbook-2013/ (accessed in May 2016).
 Neukirch, ‘Fast tracking monitors to Ukraine’ (2014).85
 OSCE Resources, Pre-arrival Information Package for new OSCE mission members (2015), online available: 86
http://www.osce.org/employment/78294 (accessed in May 2016).
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the CPC organises high-level mediation coaching sessions for Heads of Missions and Special 
Representatives and courses on dialogue facilitation for staff members.   87
A final feature of the OSCE model is the ongoing development of a so-called virtual pool of 
equipment. This removes the need to store large amounts of physical equipment and yet 
enables a timely and reliable access to essential material resources — from armoured 
vehicles to computers — when required.  
The OSCE has a warehouse in Vienna with equipment from missions which were closed 
(e.g. the recent mission in Azerbaijan), but it only stores small amounts of key equipment. 
When the OSCE develops a mission it normally asks for in-kind contributions from the host 
authorities, otherwise it purchases everything through the Procurement Unit. In the case 
of the SMM in Ukraine, everything was purchased rapidly through the procurement 
database and a special system of contracts that allows for quick deployment. The 
countries that the OSCE has worked with and currently has missions in have the ‘window 
contracts’ (or framework contracts) with certain companies. These are especially useful in 
the case of a mission as the OSCE does not need to go through a vetting process but can 
purchase without delay.  
The creation of the virtual pool is also a recognition of the fact that, since the OSCE is not 
regularly deploying large missions at short notice (unlike the UN), keeping large amounts 
of items is not efficient. In particular, this system is designed to meet the needs of a team 
consisting of up to ten experts who need to be deployed within three days. It delivers 
essential mission equipment such as: vehicles, satellite and mobile phones, very high 
frequency radios, GPS, generators, computers and printers, office furniture, personal 
protective equipment, security cameras, and emergency rations. The usefulness of this 
tool was demonstrated by the SSM in Ukraine. As a result of the pre-established database 
and contracts, the OSCE Secretariat made all necessary arrangements within days so that 
when the OSCE personnel arrived on the field, they already had access to everything 
required for the mission.  88
 Neukirch, ‘Early Warning and Early Action’ (2014).87
 Neukirch, ‘Fast tracking monitors to Ukraine’ (2014); Neukirch, ‘Early Warning and Early Action’ (2014).88
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4. CAPABILITIES FOR EU CIVILIAN MISSIONS 
This paper has so far provided an overview of civilian missions in the EU, UN and OSCE as 
well as an introduction to how missions are planned and resourced. It is now time to zoom 
in on the civilian capabilities of the EU. The report focuses on finance, personnel and 
equipment. When analysing (civilian) capabilities, it is worth distinguishing between 
advance and crisis response planning.  The EU engages in advance planning before the 89
eruption of a crisis to be ready to ‘hit the ground running’ when it deploys. Advance 
planning is about generic concepts, scenarios and options (e.g. a SSR mission to Africa).  90
Crisis response planning, on the other hand, deals with ‘real crises’ and starts when the 
possibility of actual EU action is considered appropriate.  91
For the purpose of this paper the distinction between advance and crisis response planning 
is useful, as they are each closely tied to capabilities. In terms of advance planning, 
budgets need to be planned, capability catalogues and personnel rosters need to be drawn 
up, and tender contracts for equipment need to be negotiated. If budgets, personnel and 
equipment are not in place prior to a crisis, there are likely to be delays in deployment. In 
terms of crisis response planning, it is about the actual use and deployment of civilian 
capabilities. A mission budget needs to be established, personnel must be selected and 
trained, and equipment needs to be purchased. In other words, it is necessary to consider 
all capabilities in terms of advance and crisis response planning. 
4.1. FINANCING OF MISSIONS AND PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES 
4.1.1. Multiannual Financial Framework and CFSP budget 
The EU’s civilian CSDP missions largely fall under the overall EU budget. While the member 
states unilaterally continue to pay the salaries of their seconded personnel, other costs 
such as the per diems are paid for by the EU. The EU also pays for all contracted staff and 
for the equipment. As such the funding for civilian CSDP missions is significantly different 
from military CSDP operations, where common costs are administered through the Athena 
mechanism and thereby kept outside of the regular EU budget. While it remains expensive 
for member states to contribute civilian staff (as a result of the salary costs involved), the 
fact that the EU pays for a significant proportion of the expenditure makes the search for 
contributions slightly easier. On the other hand, due to these arrangements, various EU 
actors (the European Commission, Council, European Parliament, and European External 
Action Service) have to negotiate the budget, and civilian missions are subject to strict EU 
procurement rules. 
Because civilian CSDP missions are largely paid through the EU budget, a starting point is 
the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework, which sets the key parameters of the 
annual EU budgets. This state of affairs is inherently problematic as it is impossible to 
predict crises over such a long period. This was particularly obvious in the early years of 
civilian CSDP, when the number of missions increased rapidly (see Figure 1). In these early 
 While these are essentially military terms in the EU context, it is a useful distinction as well for civilian 89
crisis management. See EUMS, EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level, 10687/08 
(16 June 2008), paragraphs 11-3; figure 1; L. Simón, ‘Command and control? Planning for EU military 
operations’, Occasional Paper 81, (Paris: EU-ISS, 2010), pp.11-2.
 Within advance planning itself, one can distinguish between generic planning (drawing up overall concepts) 90
and contingency planning (preparing for a specific crisis). The EU is relatively weak in contingency planning for 
political reasons. This paper therefore focuses on generic planning.
 EUMS, EU Concept for Military Planning (2008), paragraph 13.91
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stages, funds were always in short supply precisely because these missions had not been 
sufficiently budgeted for as part of the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework. In 
2005, for example, the budget of all the civilian missions was only €59 million, which 
could not cover the mission in Aceh.  While the budget went up to €251 million in 2008, 92
this proved insufficient for the new missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Georgia. In the 
budgetary period 2013-2020, however, the number of missions has stabilised (see Figure 1) 
and the total amount of annual funding available for civilian missions (€235-280 million) is 
generally sufficient, even though the budget is currently frozen.  93
Problems remain with crises that suddenly arise during the year. This was the case with 
the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. The launch of the SSR mission in Ukraine was, for example, 
“possible only because of the transfer of funds from other budget headings”.  It is useful 94
nonetheless to briefly describe the mechanisms for increased flexibility. First of all, 
precisely for such cases, the EU has established a budget heading for “emergency 
measures”. This includes €37 million on an annual basis for unforeseen events. Second, it 
is also possible to use money from outside the CFSP budget, which occurred in the case of 
Ukraine.  If the amount of transferred money is less than 10% from either the sending or 95
receiving budget line, the Commission itself can make such a decision on reallocation. If it 
is more than 10%, the Commission needs to negotiate with the budgetary authorities in the 
Council and the Parliament. Third, the EU builds-in margins within the budgets of civilian 
missions to ensure there will be savings that can be used to enable more flexibility. 
Budgetary lines are also relatively unspecified (compared to the UN and OSCE). The EU 
budget includes separate budget lines for the large-scale civilian operations in 
Afghanistan, Kosovo and Georgia. All the other missions, however, are grouped under one 
budget line. This means that money can also be relatively easily transferred from mission 
to mission. That having been said, the budgets for the individual missions are also 
specified in the Council Decisions. However, Council Decisions cover the full period of the 
civilian mission, which can be more than one year, which creates some flexibility across 
years. Furthermore, Council Decisions are not negotiated by the Parliament, thereby 
reducing the number of actors with veto power. 
4.1.2. Use of the CFSP budget 
The CFSP budget can be used for operational activities taking place outside the European 
Union. It is thus different from the administrative budget of the EU institutions, EEAS and 
the various crisis management directorates. This distinction is important, because it 
means that the CFSP budget cannot, in principle, be used to strengthen mission support 
structures in Brussels, training in Brussels or even the travel of Brussels-based officials. 
The EU is thus currently in a situation where civilian missions typically have sufficient 
financial resources, but where the Brussels support structures are operating on a 
shoestring. The result is a decentralisation of functions, which often results in severe 
inefficiencies. For instance, many administrative functions (HRM, finance, ICT) are located 
within the missions and are thus, by definition, temporary. Staff members leave after their 
rotations, or when the mission ends, and experience is thereby lost. 
 EU-ISS, ‘CFSP Budget’, Yearbook of European Security (Paris: EU-ISS, 2013), p. 268.92
 European Commission, DRAFT General budget of the European Union (2015), p. III/905.93
 High Representative, Contribution to the June 2015 European Council (2015), p. 9.94
 Interview #2, Brussels, February 2016.95
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The rules for the CFSP budget are, however, slowly but increasingly interpreted in a more 
flexible way. One key problem was that traditionally funding from the CFSP budget could 
not be used before the adoption of a Council Decision. This was rather problematic not 
only when missions had to be established quickly (e.g. in the case of the Aceh Monitoring 
Mission in 2005), but also for sending a fact-finding mission early in the planning process. 
Keeping EEAS staff on the ground for weeks or months, at great expense, was difficult 
given the constraints of the administrative budget.  
Two important improvements have been made. First came the creation of the so-called 
‘preparatory measures’, which were used for the first time in 2007.  These allow the EU 96
to spend money from the CFSP budget, over a short period, to “establish the conditions 
for Union action … and for the adoption of the necessary legal instruments”.  This 97
includes, inter alia, “to assess the operational requirements, to provide for a rapid initial 
deployment of resources, or to establish the conditions on the ground for the launching of 
the operation”.  This is not so different, then, from the procedures in the UN and OSCE. 98
Naturally, there has been some discussion what the phrases “short” and “conditions” mean 
in this provision. The interpretation of this provision has widened over time.  Preparatory 99
measures can now also be used during the planning process to fund fact-finding by EEAS 
staff, for example.  
More important than the preparatory measures were, secondly, the formal revisions to the 
Crisis Management Procedures in 2013. A key change has been to adopt two Council 
Decisions during the planning process rather than one. By having a Council Decision early 
in the planning process (at the same time as the initial Crisis Management Concept), it is 
possible not only to have a budget for a possible future mission, but also to appoint key 
staff early in anticipation of the mission. To a certain extent this replaces the rationale for 
preparatory measures. While this has been a recent and a useful development, it is worth 
pointing out that the EULEX Kosovo mission essentially followed this model already. In 
2006, the EU established the Kosovo Planning Team through a Joint Action to be able to 
prepare for the deployment of EULEX to Kosovo in 2008.  100
4.1.3. Procurement procedures 
Making the money available is one thing; spending it is quite another. Procurement is an 
area where traditionally a lot of problems occur, inter-institutional tensions arise, and 
deployment delays occur. Essentially, there are two challenges. First, while all CSDP 
missions are in principle allowed to adopt their own procurement rules,  in practice they 101
follow EU procurement rules laid down in Financial Regulation.  These procurement rules 102
are not perfectly tailor-made to each difficult situation in conflict countries. Second, the 
 To appoint the Head of Mission-designate for EULEX Kosovo in 2007 to prepare for EUMM Georgia in 2008.96
 Regulation (EU, Euratom) of the European Parliament and of the Council, On the financial rules applicable 97
to the general budget of the Union, No 966/2012 (25 October 2012), article 54(c).
 Ibid.98
 Interview #2, Brussels, February 2016.99
 Council Joint Action, On the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU 100
crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo, 2006/304/CFSP (10 
April 2006). Joint Actions were renamed Council Decisions with the Treaty of Lisbon.
 Regulation (EU, Euratom), On the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (2012): 101
Article 60(2).
 Written correspondence #9, June 2016.102
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EU procurement rules are complex. This requires specialised administrative expertise 
within the CSDP missions for the rules to be correctly adhered to. Given the staffing 
procedures, such expertise is not always available (at short notice). Administrative staff is 
typically contracted and the CPCC does not have sufficient manpower to cover these 
functions (see also Mission Support Platform 4.3.3). Because of both challenges, the 
European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), which administers the 
CFSP budget, is often in a tricky spot. It needs to navigate between the demands of the 
missions and the requirements of the budgetary authorities.  103
The EU has made significant improvements in terms of procurement following previous 
negative experiences, such as the Afghanistan mission. These include framework 
contracts, a warehouse and provisions on crisis situations. Framework contracts are 
important, since they are established prior to a CSDP mission. They allow the EU to select 
preferred suppliers for a certain period of time. This is about advance planning. These 
suppliers can subsequently deliver, during crisis response planning, and there is no longer a 
need for a separate procurement procedure. Missions currently have ready access to 
framework contracts on armoured and off-road vehicles, ICT, security and medical 
equipment, audit services as well as health and high risk insurance.  To further speed up 104
procurement, missions can order supplies through the warehouse (see Section 4.3.2), 
which replenishes stocks through the framework contracts.  
Another method to create flexibility is to apply the exceptions for ‘crisis situations’.  105
While these provisions formally apply for “crisis management aid, civil protection 
operations or humanitarian aid operations”,  they are now also used for civilian CSDP 106
missions. The exception allows, for example, for the procurement to take place without a 
formal call for proposals and the use of negotiated procurement procedures with shorter 
deadlines (10-15 days) in extremely urgent cases. While the use of these exceptions is 
important, it needs to be said that more flexible procedures are not necessarily much 
easier to implement. A staff handbook from DG DEVCO, which has had more experience 
with these exceptions, notes that flexible procedures require an additional justification 
and documentation burden.  There are no magic bullets: “[a] crisis will generally make 107
any type of procedure more difficult and more time consuming”.  108
 S. Blockmans and Ch. Hillion (eds), A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the 103
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (Brussels: CEPS, February 2013).
 Written correspondence #9, June 2016.104
 “Crisis situations in third countries shall be understood as situations of immediate or imminent danger 105
threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country. Crisis situations shall also be 
understood as situations caused by natural disasters, manmade crisis such as wars and other conflicts or 
extraordinary circumstances having comparable effects related inter alia to climate change, environmental 
degradation, privation of access to energy and natural resources or extreme poverty.” Commission Delegated 
Regulation 1268/2012: Article 190(2).
 Commission Delegated Regulation, On the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of 106
the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the 
Union, 1268/2012 (31 December 2012): Article 190(1)(a).
 DG DEVCO, ‘Using flexible procedures in situations of conflict and fragility’, in Operating in situations of 107
conflict and fragility: EU staff handbook (n.d.), online available: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/
default/files/file/09/04/2015_-_1046/staff_handbook-english-note_6.pdf (accessed 8 June 2016).
 Ibid., p. 82.108
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4.2. SELECTION, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF STAFF 
In addition to the financial capabilities, personnel is a critical capability for civilian 
missions. Once again, it is useful to distinguish between the generic mechanisms and 
procedures to identify and prepare staff for possible deployments, on the one hand, and 
the crisis response processes to recruit and train staff for actual missions on the other.  
4.2.1. Headline goals and civilian capability plans 
Having qualified personnel for civilian missions is about selecting the best people with the 
right expertise who happen to be available when a crisis breaks out (see further Section 
4.2.3 below). The problem is naturally that such personnel might not be available quickly, 
if they have not been pre-selected and appropriately trained. As such, the EU and its 
member states have put significant effort, with respect to personnel, in terms of advance 
planning.  
An important starting point are the European Council conclusions in Santa Maria da Feira 
from June 2000, which specify that the civilian crisis management priorities are police, 
rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.  The same conclusions gave 109
concrete targets for police, such as the ability to have up to 5,000 EU police officers 
deployed in international civilian missions (including in UN, OSCE and EU).  Another 110
target was to have 1,000 police officers available as a rapid deployment capability (within 
30 days). The conclusions furthermore provided several concrete operational scenarios. 
This process was followed-up by the Civilian Headline Goals 2008 and 2010. It mirrored 
actions taken in military CSDP, where the member states attempted to agree on the level 
of ambition and drawing up capabilities catalogues. 
The EU continued with the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan in 2012. 
Based on the experience with civilian missions, this exercise has been much more practical 
than some of the initial setting of overall goals. This is partially the result of an 
understanding that the member states not only remain firmly in charge of civilian 
resources, but also vary dramatically in terms of what and how they can deliver. An 
example of the more incremental and facilitatory approach is the establishment of the list 
of generic civilian tasks in 2015.  These tasks were grouped under command and control, 111
engage and implement, inform, set up and sustain, and duty of care. Developing generic 
civilian tasks has become a very practical exercise, with actions such as figuring out how 
to conduct recruitment interviews via Skype on EU computer platforms. 
4.2.2. Pre-identification of personnel, training, roster 
In addition to setting levels of ambition and making sure that all the concepts and 
procedures are in place prior to a crisis, it is important that potential personnel have been 
pre-identified, trained and can somehow be contacted when required. Much of this 
process is in the hands of the member states. After all, they have the responsibility for 
their own police officers, prosecutors and judges. They should also make sure that their 
personnel have the appropriate competences, are medically fit, and can be deployed 
abroad. Member states vary significantly in terms of how they carry out these tasks; and 
many have been uncooperative as regards EU initiatives to identify and train personnel 
prior to the outbreak of a crisis. 
 European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency (19-20 June 2000), Annex 1, Appendix 3(b).109
 European Council, Conclusions (2000), Annex 1, Appendix 4.110
 Interview #6, Brussels, April 2016.111
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It is worth pointing out some of the shining examples among the member states.  112
Particularly the Nordic member states take the pre-identification of personnel and training 
seriously. Before they can be added to one of the national rosters, candidates must enrol 
in a core generic training programme equivalent to at least two-to-four full-time weeks. 
Belgium and Germany have similar training programmes as well. These training modules 
instil knowledge about international organisations and missions, but also very practical 
skills such as learning to drive 4x4 vehicles and Hostile Environment Awareness Training 
(HEAT). Some of those skills are also taught during pre-deployment and in-mission training 
(see below), but naturally it is better if staff already have these skills prior to 
recruitment. It facilitates rapid deployment. One key issue is the link between core 
generic training and actual deployment: training is expensive and many trained staff 
members ultimately do not go on actual missions.  
In addition to these national processes, the EU has put considerable energy into creating a 
European roster. This effort has been largely futile for a variety of reasons. First, the EU is 
spending a lot of time and money to set up an online system — named Goalkeeper — to 
keep track of potential personnel. It does not, however, have the resources to keep the 
rosters up-to-date. Since personnel listed in the databases is often not available for 
missions, the CPCC prefers to rely on the standard calls for contributions instead of the 
roster.  Second, and relatedly, the member states have been very protective of their own 113
personnel, afraid that they may actually have to deliver (and pay for these resources). So 
they have made little effort to fill the relevant EU rosters and keep the information up-to-
date.  Third, as a result of EU data protection rules and obstructive member states, the 114
EU does not have a roster of former mission staff, or their evaluation reports. All staff 
members interviewed for this study have dismissed EU-level rosters as a waste of energy. 
Instead, they seem to prefer to rely on informal contacts and institutional memory when 
rapidly recruiting qualified staff. 
4.2.3. Call for contributors and recruitment of staff 
Most of the personnel required for civilian missions are recruited and selected on an 
individual basis. This is a major administrative process. In 2014, for example, there were 
1,269 vacancies across the EU missions, for which 7,899 candidates applied. Some 2,122 
interviews were organised and 807 candidates were eventually selected. To understand 
better the significance of this challenge, it is important to describe the recruitment and 
selection process in greater depth. 
Every year, each mission is allowed to organise three ordinary calls for contributions, 
which adds up to about 30 calls per year across all missions.  While the EU tries to 115
minimise extraordinary calls, because of the extra workload entailed, it organises an 
additional 10 calls per year. These calls for contributions are sent to the member states. 
They include seconded-only positions as well as positions for seconded and contracted 
staff. In the latter category, priority goes to seconded staff when they have equal 
qualifications to their contracted counterparts. For functions in administration (e.g. 
 D. Korski and R. Gowan, Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities 112
(London: ECFR, 2009), annex II have done an extensive naming-and-shaming exercise which does not need to 
be repeated here. Some member states have made improvements since the publication of this report, but the 
overall ranking still stands.
 Interview #7, Brussels, April 2016.113
 Interview #1, Brussels, February 2016.114
 Interview #7, Brussels, April 2016.115
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finance, procurement, statistics, and human resources) and for some specialised functions 
(e.g. aviation) it is difficult to recruit seconded officials, so staff is typically recruited on 
the international market. In terms of the candidates, the bulk of applications are sent for 
the open contracted positions. Particularly contracted positions for security officers can 
each attract 100+ candidates. The deadline for most calls is three weeks.  116
For key managerial positions — such as deputy Head of Mission, Chief of Staff, Head of 
Operations, and Head of Administration — the selection panel is chaired by the CPCC and 
the Civilian Operations Commander makes the decision. Most recruitments are, however, 
carried out by the missions themselves with the Head of Mission having appointment 
power. The CPCC sends the mission the dossiers of the candidates. The mission prepares a 
shortlist of ideally three candidates. Almost all interviews, except for the deputy Head of 
Mission, are done via telephone.  Candidates are examined on the basis of an evaluation 117
grid, which includes knowledge about the EU, the mission, and the local conflict as well as 
motivation, presentation, language skills in addition to their general competence in the 
area of the position. 
While only two out of three vacancies were filled in 2014, there are large discrepancies 
between missions and across profiles. Recently launched missions tend to be very popular, 
as they are high on the international agenda. For the first call of the SSR mission in 
Ukraine, for example, no less than 1,500 candidates applied. Recruiting staff typically gets 
more difficult once the mission is running for a couple of years. Furthermore, missions 
have different profiles. The monitoring mission in Georgia is about having a presence on 
the ground, while capacity-building missions may be about providing specialised expertise. 
For example, it has proved difficult to recruit qualified judges for Kosovo: it is difficult for 
the member states to release judges, who tend to be tied up in long course cases. Also, 
their time to deployment is too long. 
4.2.4. Pre-deployment and in-mission training of staff 
Following the recruitment of mission staff, there is normally a period of about four to six 
weeks, during which staff members are prepared for deployment. This includes pre-
deployment training lasting four to five days. The member states themselves have the 
primary responsibility for organising pre-deployment training for their seconded staff.  As 118
is the case with core training, the quality of pre-deployment training varies across the 
member states.  This is partially a matter of the interest and resources of a member 119
state in training, but it also has to do with practical reasons. While large member states 
can easily run a regular course preparing staff for a deployment to Kosovo, a smaller 
member state may not be in a position to provide a tailor-made pre-deployment course on 
the much smaller EUCAP Sahel in Niger. For internationally contracted staff, the situation 
is worse as there are no clear guidelines with respect to pre-deployment training.  
In response to the problems with pre-deployment training, several (pan-)European 
initiatives have been developed. National course providers may, for example, open up 
their courses to staff from other member states. More ambitious, however, were the two 
 Under the Crisis Response Team (CRT) concept, the deadline is one week. While the formal roster for this 116
concept is no longer used, the procedures may be applied in case of the need for rapid deployment.
 There is a separate recruitment procedure for the Head of Mission.117
 CIVCOM, Enhancing civilian crisis management pre-deployment training, 17506/09 (11 December 2009), 118
paragraph 9.
 CIVCOM, Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training - report on survey results and elements for 119
way ahead, 10976/11 (13 June 2011), paragraphs 7-18.
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ENTRi projects which ran until 2016.  Both were financed through the EU’s Instrument 120
contributing to Stability and Peace and ran for a period of three years. The projects 
involved a couple of million euros and they were run by pan-European consortiums led by 
the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. These projects provided 
training for mission staff sent out on all sorts of missions, including UN, OSCE and African 
Union, but the emphasis is on civilian CSDP. ENTRi focused mostly on unarmed civilians, 
but with the emphasis on the comprehensive approach, ENTRi also welcomed police to 
foster a team-spirit already during training. 
One of the advantages of ENTRi was that it fully funded its participants (including travel 
and accommodation).  The philosophy driving this was that all civilian staff, regardless of 121
their seconding member state, should have training. This was also very attractive for 
contracted staff, who would otherwise have had to pay for their own training. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the courses were oversubscribed. Some observers were also 
sceptical about whether this leads to ‘tourism’, i.e. participants being trained, but never 
actually deployed. ENTRi, however, put a selection system in place which significantly 
reduced this practice. As a result of the project-based set up, these initiatives were rather 
flexible and helped the member states out with pre-deployment training. Yet on the other 
hand, projects are by definition temporary, and therefore ENTRi was hardly a sustainable 
solution for the future. 
It is, in this respect, relevant that the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) has 
also started to offer pre-deployment training in 2015.  The ambition is to have a four-day 122
pre-deployment training about 10 times per year, during which participants also meet up 
with the relevant desk officers who are dealing with their mission in the CPCC. The 
challenge for this system is mostly financial. Member states have to cover travel and 
accommodation. When a participant is already ‘on mission’ (i.e. flying directly from 
Brussels to the mission), these costs can occasionally also be covered by the missions. The 
ESDC borrows conference locations from the Commission and the Permanent 
Representations. The trainers are drawn from the EU institutions and thus provide their 
services for free. While the ESDC potentially offers a more institutionalised solution for 
pre-deployment training, these financial considerations are significant. 
Pre-deployment training often remains generic. There is thus a need for additional mission 
induction training. Currently, in-mission training varies significantly across missions. It is 
mostly organised by mission staff, as it is useful that new staff is directly trained by the 
mission experts. In some missions, such as Georgia, there is specific training available for 
driving with armoured vehicles, while this is not necessary in other missions. In Ukraine, it 
became obvious that very few experts had sufficient SSR expertise. A dedicated training 
was therefore organised. The EU is currently harmonising the induction training across all 
civilian missions. The aim is to provide two to three days of in-mission training with 
standardised presentations.  
In addition to pre-deployment and in-mission training, a wide range of more specialised 
courses and e-learning courses are available for staff members already deployed as well as 
those considering future deployment. The different training institutes provide 
complementary courses in this regard. ESDC courses have a civil-military character with a 
range of participants. It also offers courses for more senior participants. The European 
 ENTRi I and II included pre-deployment training. Starting in June 2016, ENTRi III focuses on training the 120
CSDP mission trainers and providing training packages for CSDP missions.
 Interview #4, via phone, April 2016.121
 Interview #5, Brussels, April 2016.122
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Union Police Services Training (EUPST) is mostly focused on police. The European Police 
College (CEPOL) also focuses on the higher-level police officers with several relevant 
courses on the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. ENTRi, as 
noted, has an emphasis on training unarmed civilian staff. In addition, the individual 
member states offer specialised courses open to international participants on their areas 
of specialisation. 
4.3. EQUIPMENT AND MISSION SUPPORT 
In addition to finance and personnel, civilian CSDP missions require equipment and mission 
support. In the area of military missions, this is often where key capability shortfalls are 
identified (from jets, ships, tanks, and bullets to air-to-air refuelling, transport, and 
medical facilities). The civilian ‘kit’ may be less impressive, but civilian missions still have 
significant requirements. Recently, the EU has made significant steps forward with the 
warehouse which makes sure that equipment is available prior to the deployment of 
missions. It has also focused on setting up a mission support platform in Brussels as a key 
enabler for administrative functions. 
4.3.1. Infrastructure, local headquarters and accommodation 
One of the key challenges during the establishment of missions is to find an appropriate 
location for the headquarters and, depending on the security situation in the country, 
accommodation for staff. The physical infrastructure must naturally be vetted for security, 
which is done by officials from the CPCC. Building contracts can be acquired, after 
prospecting the local market, through a negotiated procurement procedure.  There is 123
thus no need to put out a call for tender. Sometimes, appropriate buildings are not 
available. In Agadez in Niger, for example, the CSDP mission had to construct its own 
building.  Apart from the mission’s own infrastructure, the missions need to establish 124
procedures for medical evacuation to the closest hospital. 
4.3.2. Warehouse: vehicles, ICT systems and medical/security equipment 
In addition to the physical infrastructure on the ground, the EU established a warehouse in 
2012. The warehouse is run by a private partner in Germany, contracted through a call for 
tender, which delivers equipment to new missions during their deployment phase as well 
as to existing missions in urgent cases. It does not supply existing missions on a continuous 
basis and it does not take equipment back when missions are terminated. The warehouse 
concept is currently under review and it is likely that the function of the warehouse will 
be expanded in the future to also serve ongoing missions. 
The warehouse has a long history. With a view to rapid deployment, as specified in the 
2008 and 2010 civilian headline goals, it was decided that the EU needed to have a facility 
capable of quickly supplying new missions during deployment. The first warehouse opened 
in January 2010 on the premise of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia.  This was clearly a 125
temporary solution as EUPM would close in 2012, but it was a convenient solution to 
 Commission Delegated Regulation, On the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 123
(2012), Article 134(1)(h).
 Interview #3, March 2016, Brussels.124
 Council Decision, On the establishment of a warehouse for civilian crisis management missions, 2012/698/125
CFSP (13 November 2012), operational paragraph 4.
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circumvent EU rules.  In the Presidency Conclusions on ESDP from November 2009, it was 126
however suggested that a more permanent solution should be developed. This suggestion 
was eventually accepted in the Council Decision 2012/698/CFSP in November 2012. The 
warehouse is interestingly financed through the Instrument for Stability, administered by 
EuropeAid, rather than the CFSP budget.  127
The warehouse essentially keeps a redundant stock. Using the framework contracts, it 
buys a wide array of equipment. It can deliver such equipment to new missions at short 
notice. Subsequently, it again replenishes its own stock.  When equipment is not covered 128
under the framework contracts, the warehouse uses the regular procurement procedures. 
As a result of the warehouse’s establishment, new missions do not have to go through the 
procurement process themselves and they do not have to wait for the supplier to deliver 
the goods in theatre. At present, the warehouse provides the mission with ICT equipment, 
off-road and armoured vehicles, security equipment (helmets and jackets) and medical 
equipment. Its supplies also include EU flags and other sorts of visibility equipment.  The 129
warehouse is naturally useful for new missions in terms of rapid deployment.  
4.3.3. Mission support platform 
As noted above, due to the financing of civilian CSDP, many administrative functions have 
been decentralised by delegating them to the missions. This includes support functions 
such as HRM, finance, logistics, IT and communications. While some of these functions will 
have to be located within the missions on the ground (e.g. press and communications), 
other functions could be better organised centrally. Decentralisation has two related 
problems. First, because missions are temporary in nature, qualified staff members need 
to be recruited during the deployment phase and are removed from their posts when the 
mission ends. Second, because civilian missions are deployed typically in difficult 
environment, administrative staff may not be interested in long-term deployments. The 
net result is that it is difficult to recruit well-trained administrative staff and to retain 
their expertise.  
In the case of the UN, this problem is addressed through the Department of Field Support 
in New York and the Global and Regional Service Centres. The EU has looked into this 
possibility for a number of years. Establishing a Shared Services Centre was already raised 
in a lessons learned report in April 2010.  A 2011 the European Parliament motion noted 130
that “by addressing the personnel, logistics, procurement and financial responsibilities of 
the civilian CSDP missions and by relieving the Heads of Mission from part of their 
administrative duties”, the Shared Services Centre “would guarantee greater efficiency 
both by pooling administrative functions, starting with the selection and recruitment of 
 UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, Ninth report of session 2010-11 (24 November 2010), 126
p. 112.
 EU, Warehouse services to enable rapid deployment of a medium-sized CSDP mission — common foreign 127
and security policy (CFSP) and Instrument for Stability, 2013/S 045-071204 (18 February 2013), online 
available: http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:71204-2013:TEXT:EN:HTML (accessed 24 May 2016).
 Written correspondence #9, June 2016.128
 Ibid.; Draft Council Decision, On the establishment of a warehouse for civilian crisis management missions, 129
13742/12 (20 September 2012), pp. 7-8.
 Council, Annual Report on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian 130
CSDP missions in 2010, 17386/10 (19 April 2010).
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personnel, and by centralising procurement and equipment management”.  The Council 131
formally encouraged the EU institutions to make work of this Shared Services Centre, 
along with the warehouse, in its July 2012 conclusions.  132
The negotiations over the Shared Services Centre have been difficult. The main premise, 
that the different missions would individually contribute in order to have this new centre 
in Brussels, has resulted in a debate over whether the CFSP budget can be used for these 
expenditures. Over time, the ambitions have been watered down: by the time that the 
Council agreed to establish the Mission Support Platform, a less ambitious name, in April 
2016, only a total of six to eight staff members were still foreseen from the original 30.  133
This does not even equate to one additional staff member per mission. These six to eight 
new staff members come on top of the approximately ten mission ‘support elements’, 
which are seconded mission staff to Brussels. As such the new Mission Support Platform, 
which is likely to become operational in 2016, is much less significant than originally 
planned. 
 European Parliament, MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION on the development of the 131
common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (29 April 2011), 
paragraph 21(c). 
 Council, Conclusions on common security and defence policy 3183rd FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting 132
Brussels (23 July 2012), Article 6.
 Interviews #6 and #8, Brussels, April 2016.133
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Capabilities are central to the success or failure of civilian missions in the EU, the UN and 
the OSCE. They are deployed to achieve the objectives of missions. As such they are as 
important for situation assessment, planning procedures and indeed the objectives of the 
mission themselves. This report has analysed the question “How, and through which 
mechanisms, do the EU, UN and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions?” The 
focus has therefore been on the procedures in Brussels, New York and Vienna, and less on 
the availability of civilian resources across the member states.  The report has paid a 134
great deal of attention to the EU, but has done so from a distinct comparative 
perspective. In terms of capabilities, the emphasis has been on financial resources, 
personnel, equipment and mission support.  
It is often said that there are trade-offs between quality, speed and costs. In the area of 
civilian crisis management, however, all are often required at the same time. Missions of 
the EU, the UN and the OSCE regularly have to be deployed rapidly, within budget, and 
they are supposed to deliver high quality results. Indeed, it is precisely when rapid 
deployment is needed that civilian missions can struggle. If missions had an unlimited 
timeframe in which to procure equipment or to recruit personnel, the challenges would be 
smaller. Yet when it comes to crisis response, civilian missions normally do not have the 
luxury of time. As this report has shown, all three organisations have developed their own 
processes and procedures to deliver rapid response and to reduce deployment times. 
The purpose of this report has been to form a capabilities-based assessment.  The first 135
section of the report set out the levels of ambition of the EU, the UN and the OSCE in 
terms of their civilian missions around the world. The second section discussed the 
procedures for planning and the deployment of capabilities in all three organisations. The 
third section zoomed in on the EU to obtain a more in-depth insight into the capabilities 
shortfalls. The systematic analysis of the financial resources, personnel policies and the 
equipment and mission support has provided us with a number of areas for improvement. 
These findings are based on actual EU experience. The activities of the UN and OSCE have 
furthermore been used as benchmarks. 
This conclusion focuses on some of the weaknesses and shortfalls identified. The method is 
the following. For each of these weaknesses, the conclusion first analyses why some 
processes in the EU are less than perfect. Second, it discusses how the UN and the OSCE 
address similar challenges and whether they have best practices on offer. Finally, the 
conclusion suggests policy recommendations and provides policy advice based on its 
comparative analysis. The UN and OSCE have a longer experience with civilian crisis 
management and it is important to see where the EU can improve. 
It has been mentioned several times that the EU has made notable efforts in improving its 
civilian capabilities to react to crises and to engage in crisis management. This should be 
stressed. While the EU encountered significant problems during the first civilian CSDP 
missions as well as significant challenges during the more ambitious missions launched in 
2007-08, it is now in a much better position to conduct civilian crisis missions. The 
mechanisms and procedures through which the EU acts have clearly improved. That having 
been said, the EU has, however, focused mostly on the low-hanging fruit. For the EU to 
engage more effectively in civilian CSDP, it needs to target some of the more complicated 
challenges (see further below).  
 The capabilities of selected member states are addressed in EU-CIVCAP, Report on capability-based analysis 134
of technologies, personnel and procedures, DL2.1 (forthcoming).
 EU-CIVCAP, EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (2016).135
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One of the great paradoxes of EU civilian crisis management is that it is politically, but not 
administratively, centralised. Civilian CSDP is directed from Brussels, but not sufficiently 
supported. Overall, the high degree of centralisation, institutionalisation and legalisation 
in the EU creates a lack of flexibility. EU actors often cite the lack of ‘political will’ on the 
part of the member states. This may well be the case, but if the UN and the OSCE are able 
to pull something off, this clearly can hardly be an excuse. The remainder of this 
conclusion evaluates the three key areas relating to civilian capabilities — financial 
resources, personnel, and equipment and mission support — before drawing policy 
recommendations. 
5.1. FINANCING OF MISSIONS AND PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES 
In terms of financial resources, it is mostly good news. The main problems have changed 
over time from insufficient budget and insufficiently flexible procurement to insufficient 
administrative staff. This problem is solvable. It is worth recalling that in the early years 
of CSDP, the EU did not have enough budget for civilian missions. When the Aceh 
Monitoring Mission was negotiated during the summer of 2005, the EU had already run out 
of its CFSP budget for the year. The shortfall had to be made up through voluntary 
contributions by non-EU member states!  Similarly, negotiations over EULEX Kosovo in 136
2008 always had to consider timing, because it affected the budget. While the Ukraine 
mission in 2014 caused some budgetary problems, the overall impression is that the CFSP 
budget currently has sufficient resources. The annual €37 million for ‘emergency 
measures’ are very useful as a method to create more flexibility.  
It was not just the overall budget levels which caused complications, but also the specific 
EU procurement rules. Following the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, the EU 
has understandably adopted stricter rules when it comes to spending money. It took some 
time before the budgetary authorities and the administrators in the European Commission 
appreciated that the local situation in Afghanistan demanded a different interpretation of 
the EU rules than, say, the situation in Austria. While the procurement rules remain strict, 
a degree of flexibility has been introduced. Examples of flexibility include the preparatory 
measures, an early Council Decision in the planning process and the possibility to refer to 
crisis situations. 
The key outstanding challenge remains for the civilian missions to recruit personnel who 
have the expertise to deal with the EU’s procurement rules. When it comes to rapid 
response, this can be a real challenge. During the mission start-up phase, many processes 
need to take place simultaneously. Staff must be recruited; equipment needs to be 
purchased; etc. Yet tenders can be launched only after the mission has recruited its 
administrative personnel (see further below). This is particularly problematic as the CPCC 
does not have the administrative capacity itself to provide sufficient support. The Mission 
Support Platform should be helpful (see further below), but it does not meet the EU’s 
ambitions. A significant reallocation of the budget from the missions to the EEAS support 
structures would be appropriate. Ultimately, the member states have to pay for both the 
administrative and operational budget. A reallocation therefore makes sense. 
Policy Recommendation 1: The EU needs to reallocate funding from the 
operational CFSP budget to the administrative budget of the EEAS to strengthen 
the enabling mission support services in Brussels. 
 Dijkstra, Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense (2013), p. 133.136
  48
      DL 4.1 Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE       
When analysing the UN and the OSCE, it is apparent that financial questions are often 
complicated. In the UN context, there are equally discussions over whether peacekeeping 
operations should become part of the regular UN budget. While the extraordinarily large 
support account for peacekeeping operations is problematic in various ways, it does allow 
for a fairly flexible mechanism to pay for support staff in New York. Political missions, on 
the other hand, are part of the regular budget, which means that recruiting additional 
administrative support staff is very difficult. Similarly, in the OSCE, there are clear trade-
offs with respect to the unified budget, the need for flexibility, and the budgetary cycle. 
In the OSCE, budgetary control is exceptionally high in that every single position is defined 
within the budget and needs to be justified. Based on this comparative perspective, it is 
not obvious how the EU can further improve the financing of its civilian missions. 
5.2. SELECTION, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF STAFF 
In terms of selection, recruitment and training of mission staff, the EU has made some 
significant improvements. In terms of human resources administration, the mechanisms 
and procedures for selection and recruitment have been professionalised. Worthy 
initiatives have also been established to close gaps in pre-deployment training. However, 
two fundamental problems remain. As the member states have prime responsibility for 
civilian capabilities, it is not surprising that there remain significant variation across the 
member states. Second, the EU and its member states fail to fulfil their obligations 
towards internationally contracted staff. This is particularly problematic, as international 
contracted staff normally provide the administrative functions in the missions. 
While this report has not specifically addressed the individual member states, it could be 
said that the quality of staff and their preparation varies significantly. Despite various 
questionnaires and other harmonising initiatives, many member states remain slow on the 
uptake. Failures on the side of the member states include not keeping advanced and up-
to-date rosters of available staff, not providing their staff with adequate training, and 
simply not making qualified staff available for the civilian missions. Shortages remain 
significant. While the situation is not necessarily better at the UN or the OSCE, the high 
quality of personnel is arguably something the EU typically takes pride in. This report is 
not the place to provide recommendations for individual countries, but in many of the 
member states, there should be more serious discussions between the ministries of foreign 
affairs and interior and justice on how to improve personnel policy. 
Policy Recommendation 2: member states need to do more to ensure that well-
trained staff can be selected and recruited for civilian missions at a short notice. 
This requires more intensive coordination between the relevant ministries within 
each member state. 
The report has discussed the various pre-deployment training initiatives as well as the 
specialised courses available for civilian experts. The reality is that the member states are 
not often able to provide adequate pre-deployment training. For instance, Luxembourg 
cannot organise every three months a week-long seminar for staff from Luxembourg who 
will be deployed to EUTM Somalia. It does not have the expertise and it does not send 
enough experts. While the member states have primary responsibility to train their staff, 
it is therefore clear that European-level training programmes are a necessity. The ENTRi 
projects and the courses of the ESDC therefore fill an important vacuum. However, the 
former are temporary projects, which have now been terminated, and the latter has not 
enough financing to systematically pull it off. The EU therefore needs to make training 
much more sustainable. 
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Training is a particular problem for internationally contracted staff. Because they are 
contracted by the missions, there are no member states which take responsibility for 
training. The net result is that very few contracted staff take pre-deployment training. 
This is simply shocking. By contrast, in the UN and the OSCE, all contracted staff are 
offered pre-deployment training in the training centres in, respectively, Brindisi and 
Vienna. The problems are, however, not only with the pre-deployment training. 
Administrative staff could significantly benefit from EU training on, for example, EU 
administrative procedures. Specialised courses on procurement, logistics, ICT, etc. would 
be most welcome. While the EU as the formal employer has the prime responsibility, the 
member states cannot ignore contracted staff either. After all, contracted staff are also 
nationals with passports and it is important that all member states recognise this. 
Policy Recommendation 3: The EU needs to make pre-deployment training 
sustainable, so that every mission member can benefit from training. This 
includes increasing the training budget of the ESDC as well as making budget 
again available for flexible projects. 
Policy Recommendation 4: The EU needs to provide pre-deployment training as 
well as relevant specialised training to contracted staff.  All missions should have 
a specific budget allocated to pay for such training. 
An interesting development in the UN and the OSCE is the development of (virtual) 
standing capacities for civilian missions. The UN has a standing police capacity, which has 
been most helpful in terms of rapidly establishing and supporting missions. The OSCE has a 
Rapid Deployment Roster, which not only includes people from the Vienna headquarters, 
but also staff deployed already in various missions. While the UN, given the sheer size of 
its civilian missions, can easily afford to have such a capacity, in the case of the OSCE it is 
virtual, as the staff is normally employed in other roles. In any case, in both organisations, 
these capacities are relatively modest, but nonetheless helpful. It would also be a good 
idea for the EU to develop such capacities. 
Part of a possible virtual standing capacity is an understanding that people work for the EU 
rather than for a specific mission or body within the EEAS. When the EU wants to rapidly 
launch a new mission, it should be able to draw on the people in the CMPD, CPCC as well 
as staff in the existing missions. This already happens sometimes informally (that mission 
staff temporarily serve in other missions), but it would be more effective to do this more 
structurally. In addition to some key function profiles (e.g. police; rule of law), a virtual 
standing capacity for civilian EU missions should include administrative staff 
(procurement, logistics, security, ICT, etc.). Furthermore, a virtual capacity should also 
include qualified former mission members. A database containing a list of former mission 
staff does not exist, which is incomprehensible.  
Policy Recommendation 5: The EU needs to work towards virtual standing 
capacities that can be used to rapidly launch missions and provide specialised 
support. 
5.3. EQUIPMENT AND MISSION SUPPORT 
The EU has made major advances in terms of equipment and mission support. Procurement 
procedures have become more flexible and the negotiation of framework contracts has 
been useful. In addition, the warehouse structure, which keeps a stock and acts as an 
intermediary between supplier and mission, is a necessary step towards 
professionalisation. It is also clear that these developments bring the EU closer to the 
practices employed by the UN and the OSCE, even though it has not entirely caught up 
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yet. The ongoing negotiations concerning a Warehouse 2.0 concept, which will also service 
the existing missions, are important in this respect. The EU will also have to continue to 
establish new framework contracts for equipment. 
The key shortfall, however, has been mission support. The recent agreement to establish a 
Mission Support Platform is helpful in this respect. This Mission Support Platform, paid for 
by the missions collectively, will lead to the centralisation of support functions in Brussels. 
This also allows the EU to retain key expertise once a mission winds down. The drawback 
is, of course, that the proposed Mission Support Platform does not live up to the ambitions 
of the EU. It is simply too small when compared to, especially, the New York-based UN 
Department of Field Support and the UN Global and Regional Service Centres. Ideally, the 
Mission Support Platform should clear the field missions from most administrative 
procedures, but also provide capacity when launching new missions. This clearly requires 
more than, say, one logistical expert in Brussels. 
Policy Recommendation 6: The new Mission Support Platform needs to be 
established as quickly as possible. And it should be significantly strengthened. 
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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
This appendix gives additional information about the sources of the data used for the 
figures in the report and the methodology used to compile the data. For the sake of 
simplicity, the term ‘mission’ is used for all field operations of the EU, the UN and the 
OSCE, although several of them have different names, e.g. offices, presence and force. 
Figure 1 (number of missions and number of personnel in missions) 
Number of missions 
The following operations were included in the figure:  
• civilian and civilian-military CSDP missions of the EU; 
• peacekeeping as well as political and peacebuilding missions of the UN; 
• missions (field operations) of the OSCE.  
The data covers the period between 2003 and 2015. The missions that focused only on 
‘good offices’ and electoral missions were excluded, as they do not fall directly under the 
scope of this report. The following activities were excluded for this reason:  
• For the EU:  
• EU Special Representatives (EUSRs);  
• For the UN:  
• Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East (UNSCO);  
• Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL);  
• United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB);  
• United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia 
(UNRCCA);  
• For OSCE:  
• Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt 
with by the OSCE Minsk Conference; 
• The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Baku was excluded because of lack of available 
data. 
Number of personnel 
For the UN peacekeeping missions, the numbers of police and international civilian staff 
were added to calculate the total number of civilian personnel for each mission. The 
numbers were taken from the monthly peacekeeping fact sheets on the UN website;  the 137
average from twelve months was then calculated for each calendar year. The exception is 
the year 2003, for which the used data was from December.  
For the UN political and peacebuilding missions, the data were taken from publications 
‘Year in review’  and from UN Political and Peacebuilding Missions Fact Sheets from the 138
UN website. Data was from December, with the exception of 2014 (August)  and 2015 139
(November).   140
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml137
 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/publications.shtml138
 http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/ppbm_Aug2014.pdf139
 http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ppbm_November_2015.pdf140
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For the EU, the data was taken from SIPRI Yearbooks on Armaments, Disarmament and 
International Security.  
For OSCE the data comes from the annual reports on OSCE activities;  it does not include 141
2015 due to lack of availability of data. 
Figure 3. Components of the mandates of the EU, UN and OSCE missions in 2015 
The figure covers the mandated activities of the missions in 2015. For EU and UN, the 
main sources of data were the legal bases of the missions, respectively Council Joint 
Actions and Decisions,  and UN Security Council Resolutions.  These sources were then 142 143
supplemented with the information from the official websites of the missions. The 
exception was United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), where the 
legal basis – UNSC Resolution 1244 – is still officially in force. Yet due to the declaration of 
independence of Kosovo, the mission was unable to perform its mandated assigned tasks. 
Therefore UNMIK had been reconfigured on the basis of the reports of the UN Secretary-
General from 2008 and 2009,  and these reports were therefore taken as the basis to 144
establish what were the actual tasks performed by the mission. 
For the OSCE field operations the legal bases are mostly broad and general; the main 
sources of information were therefore the official websites,  accessed in March 2016. 145
The activities of the missions were divided into ten categories which were established by 
the authors. The evidence for each category was established directly in the sources of 
information mentioned above. The exception was the category ‘riot control’, not covered 
directly by the sources. For this category the criterion was the presence of formed units of 
police.  
 http://www.osce.org/node/66000141
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 142
 http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/ 143
 http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/UNMIK%20Key%20documents.aspx144
 http://www.osce.org/where145
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